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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters on topics in the field of housing economics and real estate
finance. This first chapter examines the impact of mortgage credit supply contraction on the supply
and pricing of rental housing in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We provide estimates
of (1) the size of mortgage credit supply shocks at the county-level across the United States; (2) the
impact of mortgage credit supply shock on housing rents and housing supply. To estimate the size
of the credit supply shock, we use non-parametric methods to identify lender specific supply-side
shocks; we then use a shift-share approach to aggregate a measure of credit supply shock at county
level. Using the county-level credit supply shock as instruments for changes in mortgage denial
rates, we reveal that housing rents respond positively to the contraction of the mortgage supply.
The impact on housing rents is heterogeneous among different income groups. Moreover, we also
document that the contraction of the mortgage supply resulted in a decline in home sales, and
increased the share of renter-occupied units. Moreover, households in the lowest income groups
are most affected. The finding suggests that recent regulatory changes in mortgage lending may
have unintended consequences, leading to reduced home ownership and increased rental housing
prices for the lowest income households.
The second chapter provides a comprehensive investigations into the heterogeneity of home
improvement and maintenance activities that has not been well explored by literature. Using
American Housing Survey data on home improvement and maintenance expenditure, we obtain
the following empirical evidence: First, speculating buyers spend significantly higher amount on
home improvement compared with non-speculating buyers, and are more likely to perform major
improvement. Second, households spend significantly more following the home purchase rather
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than prior to resale. This could be attributed to search friction that prevent households from match-
ing to the perfect home. Third, the spending of home improvement and maintenance exhibits
considerable variation across housing segments. In addition, there is considerable regional varia-
tion.
The third chapter studies housing demand inspired by the fact that housing’s relative price,
share of expenditure, and “unaffordability” have all grown since 1970. We estimate housing de-
mand using a novel compensated framework over space and an uncompensated framework over
time. Our specifications pass tests imposed by rationality and household mobility. Housing de-
mand is income and price inelastic, and appears to fall with household size. We provide a numer-
ical non-homothetic constant elasticity of substitution utility function for improved quantitative
modeling. An ideal cost-of-living index demonstrates that the poor have been disproportionately
impacted by rising relative rents, which have greatly amplified increases in real income inequality.
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In memory of my father.
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Chapter 1
Credit Supply and Housing Rental Market
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and housing bust, a large amount of research
has been devoted to better understanding the linkage between credit supply and housing price.
Academic research has focused almost entirely on the impact of mortgage supply on housing prices
during the boom-bust cycle. However, housing rents, which are closely related to housing prices,
have been largely overlooked. In this paper, we fill this gap in the literature by examining rents
dynamics in the post-crisis period. This work shows the role played by mortgage supply provides
a possible explanation of the recent dynamics in housing market.
Since the housing bust and subsequent financial crisis, U.S. mortgage lenders have significantly
tightened their lending standards. Tighter lending conditions have likely contributed to the steep
decline in the home-ownership rate as well as to the slow recovery in residential construction. In
addition, tight mortgage credit may pose a problem for housing affordability, as the historically
low interest rate over the past few years mean that mortgage-financed owner occupied housing
would be less expensive than rental housing for many people. More broadly, there is considerable
evidence connecting the availability of household credit to overall consumer demand.
While the evidence that mortgage credit conditions have tightened is fairly strong, it is difficult
to quantify the magnitude of the tightening or to disentangle the effects of tight mortgage supply
from low mortgage demand. Factors such as low credit scores, high debt balances and a lack
of liquid assets also prevent households from qualifying for a mortgage, contribute to reduced
demand for owner-occupied housing. For example, the decline in mortgage origination to less
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credit-worthy borrowers over the past few years (see Bhutta (2015)) likely reflects more stringent
lender standards; but it also likely reflects relatively weak labor market conditions among such
borrowers, as well as reluctance by more financially vulnerable households to assume housing
market risk following a period of extreme volatility. Focusing on the most recent time period from
2012-2014, we show that lenders progressively tightened their standards in the years following
the financial crisis. Much of this tightening occurred for loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), which dominated lending to borrowers with low credit scores during this
time period.
As Figure 1.1 Panel A shows, the homeownership rate steeply declined following the financial
crisis. Meanwhile, the fraction of income spent on rents rose substantially, as illustrated in Figure
1.1 Panel B. While housing prices fell for a period of several years following the 2008 crisis, the
median rent national-wide, by contrast, continued to rise from 2007. Between 2010 and 2014,
housing rents in some metropolitan areas increased dramatically, far exceeding the average growth
rate of housing price, as Figure 1.1 Panel C shows. Rent and housing prices do not always move
in the same direction. Nor do they always share similar patterns.
One possible explanation for these observations is that the limited mortgage credit supply fol-
lowing the financial crisis has affected housing tenure choice, leading to recent housing market
dynamics. The ability to secure mortgage credit is a key determinant in a households’ decisions
about whether to purchase houses in which to live; more than 80 percent of purchases involve
mortgage financing. When mortgage lending standards tightened( i.e., the required down payment
amount increases, or the maximum loan-to-income ratio falls), the demand for owner-occupied
units falls because mortgages are less accessible or affordable particularly, for low-income house-
holds or minority households. A limited mortgage supply might result in a higher demand for
rental units and a resulting shift in the prices for rental units.
The argument regarding how the shift in mortgage supply generate changes in the housing rents
seems intuitive, but empirical estimation of the size of this effect has proven challenging. In par-
ticular, it is difficult to disentangle demand-side factors. To identify the causal effect of mortgage
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credit supply on housing rents, we first utilized the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
on loan applications to identify the lender fixed effect as a measure of lender-specific mortgage
supply shock. We then create a measure of the county-level credit supply shock with a shift-share
approach based on the county’s exposure to different banks. This approach is based on the fact
that the credit supply shock to a county depends on the composition of lenders inside that county.
If Lender A contracts more credit than Lender B, then counties with a high concentration rate with
Lender A will suffer a larger credit contraction than counties with a higher concentration rate with
Lender B. This effect also depends on the ability of substitution across lenders. If borrowers can
perfectly substitute across lenders then contraction by specific lenders will have no effect on the
total credit supply conditions of the local area. The current literature, however, suggests that the
substantial friction exist, rendering mortgage shopping by would-be borrowers ineffective. 1 Using
the county-level credit supply shock as an instrument for changes in denial rates, we quantified the
impact of mortgage supply contraction on housing rents and housing stock.
This paper first provides evidence that mortgage credit conditions have been tightened fol-
lowing the financial crisis and it then goes on to estimates of county-level supply shocks. Using
instrumental variable estimates, the paper indicates that housing rents respond positively to the
tightening of mortgage supply. We find that a 1 percent increase in the denial rate predicts a 0.85
percent increase in housing rents. In addition, our finding reveals heterogeneous impact on rents
among different income groups, with the poor particularly affected.
This paper contributes to several strands of the existing literature. First, it adds to the limited
literature examining rental housing dynamics in the wake of 2008-2009 financial crisis by propos-
ing that constrained credit conditions played a role in raising rents. Second, it provides estimates
of credit supply shocks at the county-level and identifies the shocks’ source, which help us to un-
derstand the geographic distribution and magnitude of changes in credit conditions that took place
in recent years. Third, the identification strategy does not rely on one-time events to achieve iden-
tification, and therefore can be easily used to extrapolate the impact on other time periods or policy
1Woodward and Hall (2012) and Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) both show that shopping by would-be borrowers
in the mortgage market is ineffective, potentially due to confusion, incorrect beliefs, and non-price preferences.
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changes. Furthermore, this paper extends its research to examination of the linkage between rent
growth and housing price growth, and reveals that they do not always grow in the same direction.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews recent literature on the economics of credit
supply. Section 1.3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 1.4 discusses the identification
strategy and the econometric framework. Section 1.5 reviews the IV estimates. Section 1.6 pro-
vides robustness checks. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Motivation and Related Literature
This paper builds upon a considerable economics and finance literature, related to several strands of
literature. It relates to literature that studies the dynamics of housing rents following the financial
crisis. The most closely related work is Gete and Reher (2018). By exploiting heterogeneity across
MSAs in exposure to lenders which suffered regulatory shocks following the Dodd-Frank Act,
they found that tighter lending standards increased demand for rental housing and consequently
resulted in higher rents, depressed homeownership rates, and an increased supply of rental units.
This paper takes a different approach to this research topic by using different geographic units as
primary observation units - counties are the primary unit of local mortgage markets because there
is substantial evidence that many borrowers shop locally for their mortgages.2 Gete and Reher
(2018) rely on the MSA as observation unit to estimate parameters of interest. However, MSA is
too broad for defining the local mortgage market and housing market because the distribution of
lenders varies substantially across counties within the same MSA. Housing prices and rents also
experience significant variation in growth rates across different Zip Codes within same MSA. This
paper adopts a different empirical strategy than Gete and Reher (2018), who use the 2008 mortgage
application share of lenders that underwent a capital stress test between 2011 and 2015 , and the
2Based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Amel et al. (2008) find that the median household lived
within four miles of its primary financial institution and that 25 percent of households obtained mortgages from their
primary financial institution. In addition, more than 50 percent of households obtained mortgages from lenders less
than 25 miles away.
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Big-4 bank branch deposit share in 2008 as the instruments.3 By contrast, this paper constructs a
county-level supply shock as instruments, which could reflect the change in credit conditions in
local markets through time. Moreover, our empirical strategy utilizes the characteristics of panel
data for further analysis. This paper also examines a longer period from 2008 to 2014, during which
we observe a negative relationship between rent growth and housing prices; this relationship seems
contradictory to what would be expected using the standard asset pricing theory. In addition, this
paper provides estimates of credit shock at the county-level, which itself is an important question
regarding the size of the supply shock to household credit.
Another line of research in this field investigates the linkage between mortgage credit supply
and housing prices during the housing boom and bust cycle. Noted work by Di Maggio and Ker-
mani (2017) and Favara and Imbs (2015) provides some empirical evidence for this linkage. They
make use of the federal preemption of national banks in 2004 from local laws against predatory
lending and US branching deregulation, respectively, as instruments for credit supply. Di Maggio
and Kermani (2017) find that U.S. counties with greater mortgage origination experienced higher
housing price increases during booms, and steeper housing price drops during busts. Favara and
Imbs (2015) provide evidence that access to credit is an important driver of house prices in both
statistical and economical senses. Anenberg et al. (2017) construct a new measure of mortgage
credit availability by using a frontier estimation approach. They estimate this “loan frontier” by
using mortgage data from 2001 to 2014. Their estimates reveal that the expansion of mortgage
credit during the housing boom was substantial for all borrowers, but the contraction was most
pronounced for low-score borrowers. Using variation in the frontier across different metropolitan
areas over time, they show that credit availability played an important role in the recent housing
cycle. 4
This paper complements literature on the post-financial crisis mortgage-origination behaviors
of financial institutions subject to financial regulations during the 2010-2014 period. So far, most
3Big-4 banks are defined as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Citigroup
4 More literature on this topic include: Adelino et al. (2012), and Glaeser et al. (2012). In addition, Mian and Sufi
(2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), and Ben-David (2011) provide evidence of relaxation of mortgage credit
availability during the 2000s, suggesting a relationship between mortgage availability and the housing boom.
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of the literature has focused on the period during the housing boom and before the financial crisis.
Some recent empirical work includes an examination by Dagher and Kazimov (2015) of the im-
pact of bank’s exposure to market liquidity risk through the wholesale funding of their supply of
credit during the financial crisis. These authors found that whole sale funded banks significantly
increased their denial rate in comparison to retail banks. D’Acunto and Rossi (2017) document
that large U.S. financial institutions have reduced mortgage credit for middle-class households and
increased credit to wealthy households as a reaction to the Dodd-Frank Act. Calem et al. (2017)
document the mortgage supply contracted as the result of stress-tested banks reducing their ap-
proval rates and their share of jumbo mortgage origination. Chen et al. (2017) find evidence that
Top 4 banks decreased small business lending.
In addition, this paper is related to literature that studies the impact of mortgage credit avail-
ability on the labor market and other outcomes. Ouazad and Rancière (2016) use an instrumental
variable that measures banks’ liquidity conditions in the early 1990s to identify the causal effect of
relaxed lending standards on racial segregation across neighborhoods in metropolitan areas during
the recent housing boom. They showed that the relaxed lending standards led to significant out-
flows of whites from black and racially-mixed neighborhoods. Antoniades and Calomiris (2018)
study the impact of mortgage market conditions on presidential political election from 1996 to
2012. They found that voters punish incumbent presidential candidates in response to the contrac-
tion of credit at the county-level, but they do not reward them for expansions in mortgage credit
supply during boom times. Mondragon (2018) investigates the impact of contractions in the supply
of credit to the decline of employment during the Great Recession. Using the collapse of Wachovia
as a natural experiment, he provides new estimates of the elasticity of employment with respect to
household credit.
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1.3 Data and Sample
1.3.1 Mortgage Data
The main data source for mortgage supply for the years 2007-2014 is the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act (HMDA) data set.5 HMDA requires both commercial and saving banks and also non-
banking financial institutions (mortgage companies and credit unions) to report mortgage origina-
tion activities each calendar year. HMDA provides detailed information on borrower characteris-
tics, such as race, gender, ethnicity, and income; and information on loan characteristics, including
loan size, loan purpose, owner occupancy, loan type, property type, lender identifier, lien status
of the loan, and the location of the property for which the application was filed. We merge the
HMDA application-level data by lender and year with the HMDA reporter panel to identify the
parent institutions then aggregate financial institutions at the bank holding company level.
We restrict the sample to loan applications for owner-occupied home purchases, 1-to-4 fam-
ily dwellings. The sample is also limited to loan applications that were either denied or approved,
thus excluding loans purchased from other institutions and applications with ambiguous outcomes,
such as withdrawn applications, pre-approval denied applications or incomplete files.6 We exclude
loan applications for households with incomes of less than $1,000, loan sizes of less than $1,000,
or loan-to-income ratios greater than 10. We drop applications with incomplete locations, income,
or demographic information. We also drop mortgages subsidized by the Federal Housing Author-
ity,the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Farm Service Agency, or Rural Housing Service
(RHS). We also restrict the sample to lenders operating in more than 20 counties, though alterna-
tive cutoffs could also work. To reduce noise we limit the sample to lenders who processed with
more than 100 loan applications per year.
5Data source: https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm
6Regarding loan outcome: HMDA codes outcomes as (1) Loan Originated, (2) Application approved but not
accepted by borrower, (3) Application denied by the financial institution, (4) Application withdrawn by applicant
before a credit decision, (5) File closed for incompleteness, (6) Loan purchased by the institution, (7) Pre-approval
denied, and (8)Pre-approval granted but not accepted by the applicant. This paper limits sample to loans with the first
three of these outcome codes.
7
1.3.2 Rents and Housing Price Data
One data source for housing rental prices is the American Community Survey (ACS), from which
we obtained the median housing rents for every county-year since 2007. We created county-level
statistics by using PUMA to County Crosswalk from the Missouri Census Data Center bridge and
population weights. Because geographic definitions vary over time, we use two alternative bridges
available from the Missouri Census Data Center from the periods 2007 to 2011 and 2012 to 2014.7
The other data source for housing rents is the Zillow Rent Index (ZRI), which provides esti-
mated monthly median rents for different types of homes in various geographic levels in the the
United States.8. Zillow imputes median rent based on proprietary statistical and machine learning
models, taking into account the specific characteristics of each home and recent rental listing for
homes with similar characteristics. The median rent is computed across all homes in a given ge-
ographic unit, not only those that are currently for rent. Thus, unlike pure repeat-listing indices,
the ZRI is unaffected by the composition of homes for rent at any particular time. This enables the
valid comparison of rents through time because the index is tracking the rents for a consistent stock
of inventory. The county-level ZRI, which covers around 1,200 counties, is available beginning in
2010.
The advantage of the Zillow Rent Index is that its estimates of median rents are not biased by
the mix of homes currently for rent. The comparison between ZRI and ACS median rents is pre-
sented in Appendix Figure A.1. It suggests that ZRI and ACS median rents are highly correlated,
but that ZRI estimates are significantly higher than those of ACS.
For housing price data, we use the Zillow Home Value Index(ZHVI), which estimates the
median transaction price for the actual stock of homes in a given geographic unit and point in time.
The advantage of the Zillow Home Value Index is that it is a quality-adjusted house price index.
Zillow has estimated sale prices not just for the homes that sold, but also for all homes not for sale
7Crosswalk are available at http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html and
http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html
8See https://www.zillow.com/research/zillow-rent-index-methodology-2393/ for more information on Zillow’s
methodology.
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in that time period. Thus, its estimates are immune to the changing composition of properties that
sell in different periods of time.9 The data cover 1,035 counties in the United States.
1.3.3 Additional Data
The primary unit of observation in this paper is U.S. counties. Data from multiple sources are
collected at the county level allowing for a wide set of controls. The population and income per
capita data are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The unemployment rate
comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For housing supply elasticity, we employ the
elasticity measure constructed by Saiz (2010). Saiz’s measure is available for 269 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs). Following Mian and Sufi (2014),10 we match counties with MSAs, and
obtain a sample of 868 counties with supply elasticity available. From Zillow, we also obtain data
on sold homes, including median sale price and sold counts for various housing types.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the main covariates and outcomes for the total sample
of counties with populations greater than 5,000 residents. Panel A refers to the sample period 2008




One commonly used measure for credit market conditions is the mortgage denial rate. However, it
is an equilibrium quantity. That is, it is determined at the equilibrium of the mortgage credit market.
Denial decisions are determined by a combination of the following components: (a) the looseness
or tightness of credit standards, (b) borrower characteristics, and (c) local economic conditions.
Higher denial rates can be the result of either a tighter credit environment or a change in either the
9See Dorsey et al. (2010) for detailed discussion of this approach
10Data source for matching MSA-level supply elasticity to county-level supply elasticity:
https://scholar.princeton.edu/atif/publication
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applicant risk profile or local housing market. The key challenge of this paper is therefore finding
an identification strategy that separates the effect of changes in the supply side from the effect of
changes in the demand for credit and housing.
To purge bank-specific measures of the mortgage credit supply from all demand side factors and
location-specific factors, we employ a similar approach to Khwaja and Mian (2008), Antoniades
and Calomiris (2018), and Cornett et al. (2011). We estimate a linear probability model of the
application decision (to deny or approve) using yearly micro-level data on individual mortgage
loan application data from the HMDA during the period 2007 to 2014.11
Prob(Deniedijct) = βtXijct + αjt + αct + eijct (1.1)
where Xijct controls for the characteristics (loan-to-income ratio, log income, race, gender,
whether the loan has a co-applicant, and lien status) of borrow i applying from bank j in county c
at year t. In this specification, we control for individual borrower-specific attributes to remove all
demand-side variation associated with the changing borrower risk profile. We allow the coefficient
βt to vary with time to capture the potential shift of banks’ risk aversion. αct denotes county-year
fixed effects, controlling for the impact of local economics conditions and time-varying factors on
lending probability. For example, banks may have different lending standards at different locations
due to variation in location-specific risk, e.g.,expected income growth difference, and expected
house price appreciation differences. αjt denotes bank-year fixed effect, controlling for unobserved
time-varying heterogeneity across lenders.
The parameters of interest are the bank-year fixed effects. Extracting bank-year fixed effect
enables me to purge bank’s excessive probability of rejecting a loan application from all borrower
risk profiles, macroeconomics factor, and local demand conditions. The model of the mortgage
denial decision includes a full range of the relevant control that capture borrower, loan and location
characteristics; thus, it removes all demand-side variation that is associated with the changing
11We exclude very small banks, which are defined as those that receive less than 0.5 percent of all loan applications
within a state-year; We exclude these banks because of computing constraints in estimating all the fixed effects.
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composition of the borrower. The county-year fixed effect also likely removes some supply-side
location-specific influences. Thus, we interpret the bank-year fixed effect as a partial, but clean
measure of the change in the mortgage supply. This approach to identifying lender shocks has
been used in several contexts with varying identification assumptions to recover supply-side credit
shocks(see Amiti et al. (2016), Greenstone et al. (2014)).
As we previously discussed, we identify lenders’ fixed effect to measure the bank-specific
supply shock. To reduce noise, we limit the sample to lenders operating in at least 20 counties and
counties with at least 20 lenders in home purchases. This leaves a sample of around 2,000 counties
per year. To construct the credit shock to a county we weigh the change of each lender’s fixed
effect by that lender’s market share in the base year period with a shift-share approach. The credit




mjct−1(αjt − αjt−1) (1.2)
wheremjct−1 is the lagged market share in mortgage application of bank j in county c at year t−1,
and αjt is the estimated bank fixed effect from Equation 1.1. The difference between αjt − αjt−1
reflects a bank’s relative change in the likelihood of rejecting a loan application. This yields our
measure of credit supply shock for the mortgage market at the county level, which is available at
annual frequency for the period from 2008 to 2014.
1.4.2 Econometric Framework
With the measure of county-level credit supply shock, we estimate regressions of the following
form:
∆yct = β∆Sct + γ∆Xct + αc + αt + ect (1.3)
where standard errors are clustered at county level. ∆yjt is either the change in the log median
rents or the change in log multifamily housing stock in county c at year t, and ∆Sct is the change
of credit supply at the county level. αc is the county fixed effect and αt is the year fixed effect.
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∆Xct includes a set of the time-varying county-specific controls that may affect housing rental
market activity, i.e., changes in log per capital income, log population , and log unemployment
rate.
Furthermore, to investigate how housing supply elasticity affect the link between mortgage
supply shocks and housing rent growth, we interact the change in credit supply with the measure
of housing supply elasticity developed by Saiz (2010). Note that given that the elasticity measure
is time-invariant, the individual effect of housing supply elasticity is absorbed by the county-fixed
effects αc. Thus the regression model becomes
∆yct = β∆Sct + γ∆Xct + ζ∆SctElasticityc + αc + αt + ect (1.4)
To better interpret the coefficient, we use the credit supply shock as an instrumental variable for
change in mortgage denial rate. As we previously discussed, mortgage denial rate itself is endoge-
nous with respect to housing rents. The first stage regression takes the following form:
∆DenialRatect = ψ∆Sct + λ∆Xct + θc + θt + uct (1.5)
where θc and θt denotes county and year fixed effects respectively, and all other notations are the
same as in the previous equation. The second-stage regression becomes:
∆yct = β ˆ∆DenialRatect + γ∆Xct + αc + αt + ect (1.6)
where the coefficient β is the parameter of interest, which indicates the percentage point change in
response to a 1 percentage point change in mortgage denial rates.
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1.5 Results
In this section we first report the size of county-level credit supply shocks and describe their proper-
ties. Then we present estimation results by using the county credit supply shock as an instrumental
variable for changes in denial rates.
1.5.1 Mortgage Credit Supply Shock
Table 1.2 reports the regression results for predicting mortgage application denials, with standard
errors clustered by bank. To speed up computation, we estimate the αjt for every pair of con-
secutive years beginning in 2007. As expected, denial decision depends on a variety of borrower
and loan characteristics, as well as county and bank fixed effects (not reported here). We extract
the bank-specific supply of credit from the bank-year fixed effects in the model. We then use
the bank-specific measures of credit supply to compute county-specific changes in the mortgage-
credit-supply according to Equation (2). Figure 1.2 maps the geographic distribution of mortgage
credit supply shocks for all available counties during the period from 2007 to 2008. A more posi-
tive number indicates a more tight supply shock. The distribution of yearly credit supply shock is
presented in Appendix. As the Appendix Figure A.2 illustrates, a national credit supply contrac-
tion takes place during 2008 and 2009; very few counties experienced credit expansion in those
years. Large-scale contraction, possibly caused by financial regulation, follows the period from
2011 to 2012.
Another point of interest is how bank-level credit supply varies across different types of lenders.
The sample of lenders (referred to as “banks” for convenience) in the HMDA data includes both
depository institutions (i.e., commercial banks, savings associations, and credit unions) and non-
depository institutions. We compared their bank fixed effect through time to see the variation across
lenders. We rank lenders according to their national application share, then divide the lenders into
two groups: the Top 10 lenders, and lenders outside of the Top 10 group . Figure 3 Panel A plots
the lenders’ fixed effect, indicating lenders’ excessive probability of rejecting loan. This implies
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that the propensity of Top 10 lenders to reject loan applications increased after 2008, while lenders
outside of this group loosened their lending standards at the beginning of 2009 and did not show
much change for the years afterwards. One possible explanation for this is that large institutions
were more exposed to financial regulations, such as higher capital requirements and higher fines
on default loans. panel B of Figure 1.3 reports the coefficients by regressing within each income
group; it shows that after the financial crisis, the Top 10 banks contracted credit access across all
loan categories and income groups, especially among the low-income group. Similarly, Figure 1.4
plots the propensity to reject loan application by Top 4 banks and banks that are not among the Top
4 group. Top 4 banks are defined as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Citigroup.12
We conclude from these investigations of lenders that the change in credit supply is heterogeneous
across lender types.
1.5.2 Impact on Housing Rents
This section presents the empirical results, suggesting that housing rents respond positively to
tightening mortgage supply conditions. Table 1.3 provides the reduced form estimation results. It
reveals that bank credit supply shocks at the county level (note that here a positive shock indicates
a contraction in supply), are positively linked to housing rent growth. Column 1, which displays
the result using the Zillow Rent Index without county-level controls, yields a point estimate of
0.413. Column 2, which introduces controls, yields a similar estimate. Column 3 examines the
impact of housing supply elasticity by incorporating an interaction term. Columns 4 through 6
give the results using alternative rent measures from the American Community Survey (ACS) for
the period from 2008 to 2014; these results show slightly smaller point estimates.
Table 1.4 reports OLS and IV estimation results. The first two columns report the estimates
using OLS, finding statistically insignificant point estimates. The OLS estimates of mortgage
denial rates on housing rents would be biased if there is a negative shock to local activity led
12Chen et al. (2017) and Gete and Reher (2018) study the small business lending and mortgage lending of Top 4
banks; Both studies indicate that Top 4 banks behave differently from other banks, and that they reduce their lending.
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to credit contraction; the shock also deters rent growth through reduced amenities. Column 3
and 4 provide the instrumental variable estimates using county-level shock as an instrument for
change in denial rates. Similarly, the instrumental variable estimates suggest an economically and
statistically significant impact of the mortgage supply on rent growth. A 1 percent increase in
the denial rate resulted in 0.886 percent increase in rent growth. This positive impact could be
consistently observed using various data sources. Columns 5 to 8 present the results using ACS
median rents. Figure A.1 in the appendix provides a comparison between ACS median rents and
Zillow median rents estimates; results indicate that the two are positively correlated but different
in magnitude.
1.5.3 Heterogeneous Impact on Housing Rents
To further examine the impacts of the contraction of the mortgage supply, we divide households
into three groups based on income quantile: the top, middle and bottom third of incomes in each
county. We then calculate median rents for each of these income groups in each county. Estimation
results in Table 1.5 reveal heterogeneous impact on rents among different income groups. The
contraction of the mortgage supply mostly affects the rents among bottom and middle income
groups; by contrast, the contraction has insignificant impact on rents among the top income group.
These heterogeneous impacts may come from two sources: First, household in the high-income
group are less likely to be impacted by the change in mortgage supply because they are more likely
to buy houses without applying for a mortgage, or they are willing and able to accept a mortgage
with higher interest rate. By contrast, members of low-income groups cannot afford to buy a house
without mortgage, and they are sensitive to the change of lending standards. Second, the change
in the mortgage supply is concentrated on the supply available to low-income people. Banks are
more likely to reject mortgage applications from the low-income group, rather than from the high
income group.
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1.5.4 Impact on Home Sales
The mortgage supply affects housing rents through a tenure transition channel, it discourages
households from purchasing home, and instead leads them to move towards housing rental market.
To verify this channel, we examine the response of new home sales to the contraction in mort-
gage supply. The home sales count data come from Zillow. Both OLS and IV estimates presented
in Table 1.6 indicate that the contraction of mortgage supply has significant negative impact on
home-sale volumes. The IV estimates indicate that a 1-percentage-point increase in the denial rate
causes a 3.89 percent decrease in home sales. Thus, the contraction in credit supply significantly
contributed to the decline of home sales.
1.5.5 Impact on Housing Stock
We consider the response of housing stock to the credit supply shock. Table 1.7 reports the re-
gression results examining the credit supply and the growth of owner-occupied units and rental-
occupied units. It suggests that the contraction of the mortgage supply resulted in a decrease in the
number of owner-occupied units, and an increase in the share of renter-occupied units. It indicates
a 1 percent increase in the mortgage denial rate would result in a 0.156 percent increase in the
share of renter-occupied units.
1.5.6 Impact on Housing Construction
To examine the housing supply response to the change in mortgage supply, we also look at the
construction of new multifamily units and single-family units. To measure the construction, we
use annual building permit data from the U.S. Census Bureau Annual Building Permits Survey.
Specifically, we examine the growth in number of permits of multifamily units and single-family
units.We replace the outcome variable in Equation (5) with the annual growth in log multifamily
permits and log single-family permits. Table 1.8 suggests that the contraction of credit supply has
a significantly negative impact on the construction of single-family units. A 1 percent increase in
16
denial rate decreased new permits for single-family units growth by 7.48 percent. However, the
impact on the multi-family units permits is insignificant.
1.6 Robustness Check
1.6.1 Test the Validity of the Instrument Variable
To test the validity of the instrument variable, following Greenstone et al. (2014), we conduct a
number of robustness checks to assess whether the estimates are driven by supply, rather than de-
mand shocks. These robustness checks test whether there is spatial sorting in bank supply shocks.
We show that the estimated supply change of individual banks in a county are largely uncorrelated
with one another. This rules out the possibility that there is an unobserved factor that is both corre-
lated with local economic shocks and also attracted banks that eventually cut supply. In Table 1.9
Column (1), we regress the change in bank-year fixed effect of the bank with the largest market
share in a county against the change in bank-year fixed effect of the bank with the second largest
market share in the same county. We do not find a significant correlation between the two. In Col-
umn (2) we regress the change in bank-year fixed effect of the bank with the largest market share
in a county against the change in bank-year fixed effect of the remaining banks in the same county.
There is no evidence that there is significant relationship between the supply change of a bank
and the supply changes of other banks in the same county. In Column (3), we regress the average
change of bank-year fixed effect of all banks located in the county with the change of county-year
fixed effect. It suggests an insignificant negative relation with coefficient equals to -0.005. This
indicates that banks with positive shocks are not systematically sorted into counties with positive
shocks. These results support the validity of the instrumental variable, and is consistent with the
assumption that the supply shock of banks in a county is uncorrelated with local economic shocks.
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1.6.2 Controlling for Housing Composition
When examining rent growth, one challenge we face is the assumption that houses are homoge-
neous, while in reality, houses differ along many dimensions. If the rental units on the market
are generally in better condition or of higher quality than in previous years, then the difference
between rents could simply reflect the changes in the composition of rental units rather than the
impact of the mortgage market. We rule out this concern by leveraging the richness of the ACS
data to control for a large set of observed house characteristics, and then constructing a counter-
factual distribution of rents to test this. We construct counter-factual rents by assuming that the
price of each attribute remains constant through time, which would result in the predicted rents
only reflecting the change in quality. The predicted rents are constructed with a hedonic model
accounting for housing characteristics, following the methodology of Albouy and Ehrlich (2018),
as follows:
log(Rhj) = Xhβ + γj + ehj (1.7)
The covariates included in the regression include indicator variables for the number of rooms and
bedrooms, building size, built year, kitchen and plumbing facilities and location. This yields the
estimated coefficient β for each housing attribute. Then we use the time-invariant coefficient β
to predict the rents based on time-varying housing characteristics Xt. Table 1.8 shows the results
using the median rents based on the predicted rents; there is no evidence of change in composition.
1.7 Conclusion
Whether the contraction of mortgage credit supply was an important driving force for recent dy-
namics in the housing rental market is critical to understanding the housing affordability crisis.
In this paper we first identified bank-specific shock by extracting the bank fixed effect from esti-
mating bank’s propensity to reject loan application. The result documents that large banks have
tightened the mortgage credit supply after financial crisis, especially during the 2011 to 2014 pe-
riod. Then, by exploiting each county’s exposure to different lenders, we aggregated it into a
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county-level shock. Using the credit supply shock as an instrument for the change in denial rate,
the instrumental variable estimates indicate that tighter mortgage credit contributed significantly
to increased housing rents. The impact on housing rents is heterogeneous among different income
groups. Moreover, we also document dynamics in home sale, housing construction, and housing
stock.
Our results also have important policy implications. They suggests that recent regulatory
changes may have unintended consequences and may lead to less accessible credit for some bor-
rowers, and higher housing rents. Public policymakers who wish to promote homeownership, and
to reduce the rent burden should pay more attention to the role of credit markets in these areas.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean St.d
Panel A: 2008-2014
Denial Rate, 13,410 0.159 0.062
∆Denial Rate 13,410 -0.004 0.045
∆Credit Supply 13,410 0.017 0.031
Zillow House Price Growth 6,031 -0.026 0.089
ACS Rent Growth 13,410 0.007 0.087
∆Unemployment Rate 13,410 0.052 0.235
Population Growth 13,410 0.005 0.011
Income Growth 13,410 0.007 0.034
Panel B  : 2011-2014
Denial Rate, 4,676 0.146 0.052
∆Denial Rate 4,676 -0.002 0.038
∆Credit Supply 4,676 0.006 0.012
Zillow House Price Growth 2,759 0.002 0.084
Zillow Rent Growth 4,676 -0.010 0.065
∆Unemployment Rate 4,676 -0.110 0.080
Population Growth 4,676 0.004 0.010
Income Growth 4676 0.012 0.026
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the main variables in analysis, observed
at the county-year level.
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Table 1.2: Loan Application Rejection Regression Results
Dependent Variable Coefficients Standard Error
Female 2007 -0.0001 (0.001)
Ethnicity: Hispanic 2007 0.074*** (0.011)
Race:Native 2007 0.045*** (0.006)
Race:Asian 2007 0.015*** (0.003)
Race: Black 2007 0.119*** (0.014)
Log(Income) 2007 0.003 (0.006)
Loan to Income 2007 0.024*** (0.003)
Co-Applicant 2007 -0.029*** (0.006)
Lien Status 2007 -0.072*** (0.013)
Female 2008 -0.004*** (0.001)
Ethnicity: Hispanic 2008 0.091*** (0.007)
Race:Native 2008 0.042*** (0.009)
Race:Asian 2008 0.023*** (0.006)
Race: Black 2008 0.122*** (0.007)
Log(Income) 2008 -0.004 (0.006)
Loan to Income 2008 0.029*** (0.003)
Co-Applicant 2008 -0.030*** (0.006)










Note: This table reports the regression results for estimating mortgage application denial following Equation 1.1,
with standard errors clustered by lenders. For computational simplicity, each two consequential years are regressed
together. This table reports the results for period 2007 to 2008. Other consequential years results are available but
not reported here. We allow the coefficients of X to vary with time. With HMDA lender files we identify the parent
institution of HMDA lenders and aggregate financial institutions at the bank holding company level. All regressions
are linear probability models instead of logistic regression. When estimating a large number of fixed effects, OLS
produces consistent estimator for these fixed effect, while a logistic regression has incidental parameters problem and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: New Home Sales and Credit Supply- IV Estimation
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Denial Rate -0.833*** -0.893*** -3.664* -3.887*  
(0.307) (0.319) (1.970) (2.134)
∆Unemployment Rate 0.084 0.131** 
(0.062) (0.065)
∆log Income per Capita 0.268 0.603*  
(0.252) (0.334)
∆log population -4.423** -4.438***
(1.868) (1.503)
Estimation OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F Statistics 3.310 3.310
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-square 0.337 0.358 0.220 0.229
Number of Counties 314 314 314 314
Number of County-year Obs 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749
Sample Years 2009-2014 2009-2014 2009-2014 2009-2014
Data Source Zillow Zillow Zillow Zillow
∆ln (New Home Sales)
Note: This table presents the OLS and IV estimation results. Denial rate is the fraction of mortgage application from
county c in year t denied by lenders. County and year fixed effects are included. County controls include change in
log population, log per capita income, unemployment rate. Robust standard errors arein parentheses and clustered at

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8: New Building Permits and Credit Supply - IV Estimation
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Denial Rate 1.275 0.121 -7.275** -7.485***
(7.976) (6.621) (3.366) (2.106)
∆Unemployment Rate -0.500*** -0.464***
(0.147) (0.047)
∆log Income per Capita 2.922*** 1.724***
(0.619) (0.196)
∆log population 9.300*** 4.789***
(2.719) (0.857)
Estimation IV IV IV IV
First Stage F Statistics 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-square 0.139 0.146 0.189 0.201
Number of Counties 2,162 2,162 2,162 2,162
Number of County-year Obs 13,219 13,219 13,219 13,219
Sample Years 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
Data Source BLS, ACS BLS, ACS BLS, ACS BLS, ACS
∆ln(Multifamily Permits) ∆ln(Singlefamily Permits)
Note: This table presents the IV estimation results. County and year fixed effects are included. County controls
include change in log population, log per capita income, unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are in parentheses

































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Quality-adjusted Rents and Credit Supply- OLS and IV Estimation
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Denial Rate 0.022 0.018 0.591* 0.656*  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.335) (0.350)
∆Unemployment Rate -0.007 -0.010
(0.007) (0.008)
∆log Income per Capita -0.005 -0.039
(0.034) (0.034)
∆log population 0.475*** 0.330** 
(0.130) (0.149)
Estimation OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F Statistics 21.240 8.200
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Counties 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
Number of County-year Obs 13,280 13,280 13,280 13,280
Sample Years 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
Data Source for Median Rents ACS ACS ACS ACS
∆ln(Hedonic Rents)
Note: This table presents the OLS and IV estimation results with hedonic rents. To test if the change in rents is due
to compositional change of rental units, we construct hedonic rent index for each county-year. We first run a hedonic
regression controlled with a large set of housing characteristics , also with county-year fixed effect. The county-year
fixed effect is the hedonic rental index, which controlled the quality composition. County and year fixed effects are
included.. County controls include change in log population, log per capita income, unemployment rate. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Panel B: Changes in the Number of Owner-Occupied
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Panel D: Housing Starts, 1990-2015
Note: Panel A plots homeownership rate over time, and the data comes from the Current Population Survey. Panel
B plots the yearly change in number of owner-occupied and renter-occupied units over time, data comes from the
Current Population Survey Housing Vacancy Survey. Panel C plots the growth pattern of rents and house price for
MSAs that experienced highest (90th percentile)real rent growth during 2008-2014. Rents and house price data are
using the Zillow Rent Index and Zillow House Value Index, and deflated by CPI less shelter. Panel D plots the number
of housing starts for single-family units and multifamily units,and the ratio of single-family/multifamily units. The
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
 Top10  High Income  Top10  Middle Income
 Top10  Low Income  Outside Top10  High Income
 Outside Top10  Middle Income  Outside Top10 Low Income
Panel B: Propensity to Reject Loan Application by Income Group
.
Note: These figures plot the bank fixed effect estimated in Prob(Deniedijct) = βtXijct + αjt + αct + eijct. For
each year, we rank lenders according to national application share, then divide the lenders into two groups: Top 10
lenders and outside Top 10 lenders based on their ranks. Panel A plots the excessive probability of rejecting loan
application submitted to Top 10 lenders and outside Top 10 lenders through time. Panel B runs each regression within
the top, middle, and bottom third of incomes in each county.
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Year
 Low Income  Middle Income  High Income
Panel B: Propensity to Reject Loan of Top 4 Banks by Income Group
.
Note: These figures plot the bank fixed effect estimated in Prob(Deniedijct) = βtXijct + αjt + αct + eijct.
Top 4 banks are defined as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Citigroup. Panel A plots the excessive
probability of rejecting loan applications submitted to Top 4 banks and Non Top 4 banks through time. Panel B plots
the excessive probability of rejecting loan applications by Top 4 banks. Each regression is run within the top, middle,
and bottom third of incomes in each county.
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Chapter 2
The Heterogeneity of Home Improvement
and Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from
the American Housing Survey
2.1 Introduction
According to the Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies, American homeowner
spending on improvements and repairs will approach $340 billion in 2018, up from $314.8 billion
in 2017.1 Although home improvement has been a tremendously important economic activity, it
has been largely neglected by researchers. We believe that this topic deserves the same amount
of attention that researchers have given to housing consumption and investment decision. First,
the home improvement industry is a very important sector of the U.S. economy. Repairs and
improvement now constitute about one-third of residential sector spending, accounting for roughly
1.25 percent of the nation’s GDP. accounting for roughly one-third of total housing investments.2
Second, home improvement could be considered as a type of housing supply. Given a shortage of
new single-family homes across the U.S., home improvement and renovations of existing homes
provide a substitution for new construction. Third, home improvement activity adjusts the flow
of housing service and allows the homeowners to enjoy the amenities of the house. Fourth, home
improvement and renovations are a potential source for capital gain as they may add significant
value to the price of a house. Fifth, home improvement activity affects neighborhood’s well-being.
Within the body of current literature on home improvement, previous studies have focused on
1Source: http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/remodeling-market-to-march-higher-in-2018/
2Melzer (2017) reports that the average annual home improvement spending was $142 billion (measured in 2009
dollars) during the 1993 to 2007 period. During the same period, the spending on new home construction are roughly
$300 billion per year.
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factors that affect the decision to make home improvement. This paper contributes to the literature
on by providing novel and comprehensive analysis of the heterogeneity of home improvement and
maintenance activities from several aspects. It provides observations that have been neglected by
the literature, and challenges some traditional view on home improvement.
We utilize the panel nature of the publicly available American Housing Survey (AHS) on home
improvement and maintenance expenditure, supplemented by a rich data set of property character-
istics and household features to explore the heterogeneity of home improvement and maintenance
activities. First, we compare the home improvement spending across different home purchaser
types: flippers and non-flippers, or frequent buyers and non-frequent buyers. We provide evidence
that flippers or frequent buyers spend more money on home improvement, and are more likely
to perform major improvement. Second, we investigate the spending pattern across the holding
period of home ownership. We show that homeowners spend more upon purchasing home rather
than before selling the house. This could be attributed to search friction that prevent households
from matching to the perfect home. We do not find evidence that households defer maintenance
and upgrade their home before selling it. Third, we reveal the heterogeneity of home improvement
across housing segments. Finally, we explore the regional variation of home improvement activity
and propose a possible explanation.
2.2 Related Literature
Early research on maintenance and home improvement attempt to compare the maintenance level
between owner-occupied and rental-occupied units. The findings are mixed. On one side, in keep-
ing with conventional wisdom, homeowners take better care of their housing than do renters be-
cause of rental externality. Galster (1983) provides empirical evidence that owner-owned dwellings
have both a higher maintenance effort and a superior physical condition than rental dwellings.
Shilling et al. (1991) investigates the extent to which the type of tenure influences the net (of
maintenance) depreciation of single-family houses. They find that tenant-occupied single-family
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dwellings depreciate faster than owner-occupied units, holding everything else constant. Gatzlaff
et al. (1998) investigates the relative maintenance levels of owner-and renter-occupied housing by
examining their short- and long-run appreciation rates. However, they find only weak evidence
that long-term rates of appreciation (and maintenance levels) are substantially different between
owner- and renter-occupied housing. On the other hand, Harding et al. (2000) challenge the view
that owners take better care of the housing. They identify two potential sources of market failure
for owner-occupied housing that create incentives for homeowners to undermaintain their hous-
ing. The first is referred to as the “resale externality,” which is due to the inability of prospective
buyers to fully observe past seller maintenance. The second is “mortgage externality,” which is a
result of the limited liability of borrowers in the event of mortgage default preventing lenders from
maintaining the house. Using the American Housing Survey, they provide empirical evidence that
verifies the existence of the mortgage externality, but none for the resale externality.
Research on the determinants of maintenance and home improvement activity are relatively
scant. Ioannides (2002) uses American Housing Survey data to test the hypothesis that the mainte-
nance decisions of one’s neighbors affects the maintenance decisions of one’s own unit. Davidoff
(2006) finds that the elderly spend less on maintaining and improving their homes. Appreciation
rates from similar homes are shown to be much smaller when the head of household is over 75
years old. Gyourko and Saiz (2004) find that homeowners spend much less on housing reinvest-
ment when local house prices go below the replacement costs-by nearly 50 percent of average
annual expenditure. Construction costs are an important factor in determining whether a neighbor-
hood in a declining city will experience any significant reinvestment. A recent paper by Benmelech
et al. (2017) studies the stimulative effect of home purchases on home investment. Using data from
Consumer Expenditure Survey, it implies that home purchases stimulate home-related durable con-
sumption and home improvements.
Recent empirical studies investigate the impact of home equity on home improvements. Nega-
tive equity can decrease home improvement expenditures in two ways. First, debt overhang reduces
the incentive to invest in property because the valued created by investments in the property might
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go to the lenders. Second, a household in negative equity is more likely to be financially con-
strained as home equity is often an important source for funding. Melzer (2017) provides evidence
that homeowners with negative equity reduce their home improvement and maintenance spending
by 30%. However, their spending on other physical assets, including vehicles, appliances, and
furniture, remains unchanged. These findings could be explained by the debt overhang theory.
Similarly, Haughwout et al. (2013) finds that negative equity homeowners reduce their housing
investment by approximately 75%. Both of them use the Consumer Expenditure Survey to study
home improvements. Using 2001-2011 PSID data, Bian (2017) shows that higher LTV ratio re-
duces the probability of home improvements and finds evidence of both financial constraint and
debt overhang.
Another stream of research studies the investment incentive of home improvement activity.
Choi et al. (2014) develops a speculation-based theory of home improvement and provides evi-
dence consistent with this motive using data on costs and recoup values of remodeling projects
across US cities. Their study documents that the recoup value simultaneously increase with
home price appreciation and falls with construction cost growth. It provides evidence against the
consumption-cum-financial constraint motive. Sitgraves (2009) examines whether property own-
ers respond positively to growth in housing values by making investments in the housing stock,
and whether increased uncertainty over future house prices has a negative effect on housing invest-
ment. This study excludes homeowners who make improvements for consumption purposes, and
focuses on nonresident landlords and improver-movers-owner-occupiers who make improvements
to their housing property and resell it subsequently. By using data on all building permits on the
value and square footage of construction issued by the city of Los Angeles between 1999 and 2007,
this study finds that homeowners are more likely to make capital investments when housing values
increase, and less likely to make investment when house price volatility is high.
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2.3 Data and Sample
2.3.1 Data Source
The research questions in this paper require a rich dataset containing information on improvement
expenditures, house prices, household characteristics and mortgages. The primary data source
that is suitable for this study is the American Housing Survey (AHS). The AHS is a biennial
panel housing survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census in conjunction with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. The survey is “the most comprehensive national housing
survey in the United States”. It follows the same housing units over time. This paper uses the
AHS National Public Use Files from 1997 to 2011, which covers almost the entire recession and
thus could fully capture the impact of the nation-wide housing price decline on home improvement
during the recent economic downturn.
The AHS is a house-based panel date and provides extensive information on the attributes of
physical housing units. It also gives rich information on the occupants’ demographics, mortgage
information, and neighborhood characteristics. Compared with the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CE) and the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) family-level survey, which were used in
previous literature to study such topics, AHS is superior in several aspects. The primary advan-
tage of this data is that it has rich information on housing maintenance expenditures, even with
detailed project types, while PSID only asks households whether they spent more than $10,000 on
home maintenance. CE documents the total expenditure on maintenance, but does not differenti-
ate between types. The AHS is also the richest dataset on housing conditions, which are closely
related to home improvement decisions. Another important feature of the AHS is that it tracks
the same housing units, rather than households. Thus, by merging data over the sample years,
we could observe the turnover information and maintenance expenditure through time. Moreover,
mortgage-related information such as the terms, the interest rate, the monthly payment, and the
original loan amount are available in the AHS.
A key variable imputed from the AHS is households’ maintenance expenditure. The AHS data
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documents two types of maintenance. One is routine maintenance (CSTMNT), and the other is
major alterations and repairs (RAC). Routine maintenance includes painting, plumbing or other
minor repairs, while major alterations and repairs includes kitchen remodeling, bathroom remod-
eling, replacing siding, major equipment replacement or other additions. In this paper, we define
home improvement as major alterations and repairs, and differentiate it from routine maintenance
for several reasons: First, routine maintenance is necessary for every property to function normally.
In our sample, approximately 78 percent of households report positive routine maintenance expen-
diture, and the median and mean annual expenditure is $401 and $817 respectively. Less than
60 percent of households report positive home improvement expenditure in the survey. Second,
compared with routine maintenance, home improvement is more likely to vary across household.
Routine maintenance always costs much less, and is less likely to be deterred by the risk of foreclo-
sure or income constraint. On the other hand, home improvement usually requires a large amount
of money, which depends on the default risk and financial constraints of the household. Moreover,
when considering the decision to make improvement, we define a major improvement activity
spending for additions and replacements exceeds $5,000.3 The rationale is that if we define an
improvement as spending greater than zero, it is less meaningful, as only activities requiring large
investments would be related with default risk or will add value to the house.
In addition to AHS data, data from multiple sources are also collected. Data on MSA-level
land price, structure value and land share comes from Davis and Palumbo (2008).4 The data
provides estimates of the average value of housing, land, and structures, and price indexes for land
and housing, for the average single-family detached owner-occupied housing unit located in 46
large metropolitan areas in the United States. The data set covers the 1984Q4 – 2016Q4 period.
Construction cost indexes comes from the R.S. Means Corporation.
3PSID survey data asks questions regarding spending on home improvements and additions that exceed $10,000.
However, the fraction of households that spent more than $10,000 is too low in the AHS data. We set the threshold as
$5,000
4Data source: Davis and Palumbo (2008), “The Price and Quantity of Residential Land in the United States”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 54 (8), p. 2595-2620; data located at Land and Property Values in the U.S.,
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, http://www.lincolninst.edu/resources/
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2.3.2 Sample Selection
The AHS includes approximately 55,000 owner-occupied and rental housing units in each survey.
We restrict the sample in several ways: First, the data is limited to owner-occupied units (approxi-
mately two-thirds of the total units). As previous literature has provided evidence that homeowners
and renters have different incentives to maintain the house, the owner-occupied units and renter-
occupied units may experience a large variation in maintenance, which is out of scope of this paper.
Second, the sample is restricted to single-family units. We exclude condominiums and cooperative
apartments as the maintenance expenditures are difficult to observe. Third, we restrict the sample
to houses with a reported real value greater than $30,000. 5 Fourth, we drop observations for which
annual nominal rate of house price appreciation in absolute value was greater than 100 percent be-
tween sale dates. Fifth, we further restricted the sample to include only those properties headed by
individuals who claim an age above 20 years-old. Sixth, we drop the observations in New Orleans
during year in which Hurricane Katrina occurred, as there was disaster-related maintenance. In
addition, we delete those with unclear geographic information, either non-metro area or metro area
is suppressed.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the AHS sample. All the monetary values are con-
verted into 2009 dollars with the Urban Consumer Price Index. Panel A reports summary statistics
on household characteristics, including household income, household size, age, education, marital
status and race. Panel B reports summary statistics on property characteristics. The typical prop-
erty in our sample was purchased around 16 years before the survey date. More than 70 percent
of the households have a mortgage. The average house is 44 years old and has 3.17 bedrooms and
1.85 bathrooms. Panel C displays information on household spending on home improvement and
maintenance. The average spending on home improvement is $2,882 per year, while the average
spending on routine maintenance is $811. The distribution of home improvement is skewed, with
a large fraction of observations reporting zero home improvement spending (around 42 percent).
5We also omit properties for which the annual nominal rate of house price appreciation in absolute value was
greater than 80 percent between sale dates to avoid recording errors.
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There are only 13 percent of household conduct major improvement, which is defined as spending
more than $5, 000.
2.4 Empirical Findings
2.4.1 Home Improvement and Maintenance across Purchaser Type
Consumption motive is an important drive force for home improvement and maintenance. Home-
owners enjoy the amenities and pleasure brought by home improvement, for instance, home own-
ers satisfy their idiosyncratic taste by remodeling Mediterranean-style Kitchen. Remodeling also
serves as a substitute for moving to a better place. However, there are stylized facts regarding
home improvement which suggest that speculation would also be an crucial motive for home im-
provement as it contributes to the appreciation of the property value. For instance, “house flipping”
is a commonplace in many housing markets„ which refers to the phenomenon in which investors
buy depreciated properties, and resell the property quickly at a higher price. While the majority
of home buyers have a strong consumption motive - they intend to live in the house and enjoy
the benefit of housing service, flippers own housing purely as an investment. The pure specula-
tion motivated buyer may behave differently than non-speculating buyers. First, flippers typically
hold properties for relatively short periods. Second, flippers generally purchase properties that are
somewhat older and smaller than the homes that sell in the market.6 Third, flippers often make
significant physical improvements in houses, if improvements are optimally made or can be done
at relatively low cost.
As flippers and non-speculating homeowners may behave differently, we study the home im-
provement activities separately. A basic measurement challenge is how to identify flippers in the
data. One commonly used approach utilized by Haughwout et al. (2011) is to examine credit re-
ports: when the same individual is observed to hold mortgages on multiple properties, they may be
6Bayer et al. (2015) find that flippers typically purchase older and smaller homes using data that covers five counties
in the Los Angeles area.
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defined as a flipper. Bayer et al. (2015) define a flipper as anyone that buys and sells at least two
different properties while holding each for less than two years. As we lack available information
on the number of houses or mortgage the buyers have at the same time, we first define flippers
with the following criteria: (1) The holding period of the property is less than 24 months; (2) The
annual nominal rate of house price appreciation is great than 10 percent. In addition, to reduce the
impact of the annual appreciation rate criteria, we adopt an alternative definition for flipper, named
“short-term buyer”, which refers to homeowners who hold the property for less than 24 months.
The spending pattern across two types of buyers are summarized in Table 2.2. According to
Panel A and B, on average the annual spending on home improvement is significant higher among
flippers ($7,026 vs $2,878). To exclude the impact of years since purchase, we compare the home
improvement expenditure in the first two years after purchasing. It also suggests that flippers spend
a larger amount on home improvement upon purchasing a house, with annual average of $7,026
compared with $4,436 for non-flippers during the first two years of owning a property. Flippers
are more likely to conduct major home improvement. Flippers spend slightly lower amount on
routine maintenance. Moreover, the annual price appreciation rate of the property is significantly
higher among flippers: the real annual appreciation rates for property owned by flippers and non-
speculating are 22 percent and 3 percent respectively. According to the comparison with alternative
broader definition of flipper, the average annual expenditure on home improvement among short-
term buyer is $5,103. Regarding the spending during the first two years of owning the property,
the annual spending on home improvement are $5,103 and $4,289 for short-term buyer and non-
short-term buyer respectively.
2.4.2 Home Improvement and Maintenance through Holding Period
As we previously discussed, homeowners have both consumption motive and speculation motive
to conduct home improvement. This raises an interesting question regarding the spending pattern
of home improvement during a homeownership holding period: will homeowners spend more on
home improvement upon purchase to enjoy the benefits of housing service or defer maintenance
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and upgrade property before selling?
The spending pattern of home improvement and maintenance following home purchases is
summarized in Table 2.3. The average annual home improvement spending in the first year since
home purchase is $5,066 compared to the mean of $3,113 in the third year since home purchase.
That is, household spend more than half of the average spending beyond the first two years of own-
ership. Moreover, home improvement expenditure remains elevated in the second year of home
purchase – the annual expenditure is $4,475. This spending remains stable after the third year
of purchase, then declines after fifteen years of ownership. The fraction of households conduct-
ing home improvement is constant through years - around 60 percent. However, the fraction of
households performing major home improvement (defined as annual spending on home improve-
ment greater than $5,000) is higher in the first two years, which is 20 percent compared with an
average of around 13 percent in the remaining years. Regarding the spending pattern of routine
maintenance, either the level of spending or the incidence of routine maintenance remains constant
through time except for a slight decline after 15 years of home-ownership.
The summary statistics suggest that the spending on home improvement during the first two
years of home-ownership is significantly higher. Econometric models are estimated to further ex-
plore the spending pattern following home purchase. First, we estimate the magnitude of home
improvement expenditure after the purchase of a home with ordinary least squares, as well as a
Tobit model which is suitable for censored outcome variables. In the AHS sample, the depen-
dent variable (expenditure on home improvement) is constrained to be greater than zero and has
clustering of observations at zero.
Spendingi,m,t = α +
T∑
k=1
βk1{Years since purchase=k} + γXi,t + λt + λm + εi,m,t (2.1)
Where the dependent variable is the spending on home improvement or routine maintenance by
household i at year t in MSA m. The coefficient of interest are fixed effects for each year (βk)
since the time of home purchase. It measures the household’s spending in each year following
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the time of purchase relative to the omitted category of ten or more years after purchase. λt de-
notes year-by-year fixed effect to control for common variation in spending over time, such as
fluctuations through the business cycle. λm is MSA fixed effect. Xit includes controls for house-
hold income, household characteristics, such as household size, the age of the head of household,
whether the head of household is female, marital status, race, education and indicator for first time
home purchaser; and information on property characteristics, including number of rooms, number
of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, loan-to-value ratio, indicator for central air condition.
Moreover, we estimate the home improvement decision by logit model. The dependent vari-
able Improvementi,m,t is an indicator for whether household i living in MSA m at time t making
improvement or making major home improvements. All the other settings are the same as the
regression model estimating the spending level discussed above.
Improvementi,m,t = α +
T∑
k=1
βk1{Years since purchase=k} + γXi,t + λt + λm + εi,m,t (2.2)
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. The OLS estimates indicate that house- holds invest
significantly more on home improvement right after they have moved into a new house. In the year
following a home purchase, the average spending on home improvement is $3,343 higher than the
spending after purchasing a home with more than 10 years. The spending remains elevated in the
second year of home purchase, which is around $2,386 higher compared with the spending level
when purchasing the house more than 10 years earlier. The Tobit model yields similar results with
a slightly larger magnitude. Both OLS and Tobit estimates suggest that the annual expenditure on
home improvement decreases with time since purchase. For the incidence of improvement activity,
the logit model estimates do not suggest any difference during the holding period. However, the
probability of spending more than $5,000 per year is much higher in the first two years. Regarding
the routine maintenance, the OLS estimates suggest that the spending in the first year is slightly
higher, however, the Tobit estimates does not find significant impact of home purchase. The anal-
ysis is also presented in Figure 2.1 which plots the pattern in household spending following home
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purchase. The figures are plotted based on the coefficients of the fixed effects for each year relative
to the date of the home purchase.
The benefit of AHS data is that it allows us to track the home improvement and maintenance
activity through the whole holding period of a property. In next step, we explore whether defer
maintenance and upgrade the house before selling the house. We restrict the sample to houses that
experienced at least one turnover and exclude the sample period since last turnover date where
time to sale is unavailable. Therefore the spending pattern across the whole holding period could
be observed. In addition, we limit the sample to houses that were hold by the same household for
more than 4 years such that we can exclude the impact of home purchase in the first two years. We
estimate the following regression model:
Yi,m,t = α +
2∑
k=1




+γXi,t + λt + λm + εi,m,t (2.3)
where the dependent variable includes both the level of spending and the incidence of spending.
The coefficients of interest are βk and ζj , which compares the spending with the excluded category
of three or more years after purchase and three or more years prior to sale.
The estimates are reported in Table 2.5 and presented in Figure 2.2 as well. As Table 2.5
demonstrates, there is a significant increase in home improvement spending following a home pur-
chase, and a decline in the year prior to the sale of property. The incidence of home improvement
spending is lower in the first year prior to sale, while it does not show significant difference during
other years. The incidence of major home improvement activity is significantly lower in the first
year prior to sale, and higher in the first two years upon purchase compared with the middle years
during the holding period.
Overall, the estimates indicate that households invest significantly more right after they have
moved into a new house, and reduce their spending in the period before they move out. This could
be attributed to search friction whereby home buyers are not able to find homes that completely
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match their specific preference. Buyers therefore customize their newly purchased home to their
preferences by spending on home improvements. We do not find any evidence that households
defer maintenance and upgrade their home before selling it. This is consistent with the evidence
from Benmelech et al. (2017) using data from Consumer Expenditure Survey.
2.4.3 Home Improvement and Maintenance across Housing Segments
Several studies have attempted to investigate the difference in maintenance spending between
rental and owner-occupied housing segments. However, within the owner-occupied housing sector,
the heterogeneity of home improvement and maintenance expenses across housing segments has
been neglected. The well-known user cost of owner-occupied housing is determined by the effec-
tive rate of interest, maintenance cost, expectations about future capital gains, taxes, and transac-
tions costs, where maintenance cost is assumed as a constant share of the house value. However,
data from the American Housing Survey suggests that maintenance cost measured as a fraction of
house value exhibits large variation across housing value segments.
Table 2.6 summarizes home improvement expenditure as a fraction of house value across the
spectrum of house values (measured in 2009 dollars), as well as the routine maintenance spending
as a fraction of house values using the 2009 AHS national sample. This suggests a negative rela-
tionship between the home improvement and maintenance cost (measured in fraction) with house
value. For houses worth less than $50,000, this fraction is 2.88 percent, for houses worth between
$50,000- $100,000, the fraction is around 1.88 percent. For house value exceeding $1,000,000, this
fraction is as low as 0.33 percent. Similarly, the fraction of routine maintenance decreases with
house value. For houses worth less than $50,000, this fraction is around 1.64 percent, for houses
worth between $50,000- $100,000, the fraction is around 0.7 percent. For house value exceeding
$1,000,000, this fraction is as low as 0.09 percent. Alternatively, we run regressions of the log
improvement fraction on log house values, and find significant negative coefficient, as reported in
Table 2.7.
To further examine the variation across housing segments, we examine the spending pattern
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along purchase time by housing value segments. We divide the housing units into three value
bins: ≤$150,000, $150,000 – $500,000, and ≥$500,000. We run similar regression as in Table
2.4 replacing the outcome variable with the money spent on housing improvement as a fraction of
the total house value. As we could observe from Figure 2.1 and Table 2.4, the spending reaches
steady-state since the fifth year after purchasing. Therefore, we examine expenditure during a short
time period compared with five years after purchase. The results are reported in Table 2.7. The
results suggest that for all housing segments, the spending on home improvement as a fraction
of total house value is significantly higher in the first two years since owning the property, but
the magnitudes differ across housing segments. For expensive houses, the expenditure on home
improvement as a fraction of house value is even higher in the first two years compared with cheap
houses.
2.4.4 Home Improvement and Maintenance across Regions
Given the striking difference of local housing markets, there is considerable regional variation in
home improvement and maintenance activities. As Figure 2.3 shows, the annual average spending
on improvement ranges from under $350 to over $12,500, and the annual average routine mainte-
nance spending varies from $450 to over $1,400 across MSAs. To explain the regional variation of
reinvestment in the housing stock, Gyourko and Saiz (2004) have emphasized the role played by
construction costs and house value. Owners of homes with market values below replacement costs
spend up to 50 percent less on renovation than do owners of similar homes with market values
above construction costs. In this paper, we address home improvement and maintenance from a
new perspective: instead of focusing on the overall property value, we separate land value from
property value, and focus on the role of land share of the overall property value as a determinant
of home improvement.
As we know, the property value is composed of land value and structure value. Generally,
structure requires higher maintenance level than land. Therefore, intuitively, the fraction of home
improvement to property value would increase with structure share and decrease with land share
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(measured as the fraction of land value to overall property value). Moreover, previous literature has
shown that land value is more volatile than structure value. In other words, properties with higher
land share have higher price uncertainty. Increased uncertainty over future housing price may also
result in a negative effect on housing investment. Figure 2.4 plots the average home improvement
and maintenance spending measured as the fraction to property value with land share at MSA level,
revealing a negative relationship.
A simple model could illustrate the relationship between home improvement expenditure,
house value and land share. Housing is produced with two inputs: land L and structure S. The












0 − PS,0S0 − PL,0L0) (2.5)
Let PH0 be housing price, PL,0 be the price of land and PS,0 be the construction cost at t=0. The
first-order condition from builder’s maximization problem yields
PH,0L
α
0 (1− α)S−α0 = PS,0 (2.6)
Homeowners live one-period then resell their house. At t=1, homeowners have the option to con-
duct home improvement before reselling to future homeowners at t=2, which adds structure to the
housing unit. Let PH,1 be the expected price at t=2, and let PL,1 and PS,1 be the land price and




0 ((1− δ)S0 +X1)1−α − PS,1X1) (2.7)
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Where X1 ≥ 0, is the additional structure added by home improvement activity. PS,1 is the con-
struction cost at period 1. The first-order condition gives
PH1 L
α
0 (1− α)((1− δ)S0 +X1)−α = PS,1 (2.8)
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Let Vt denote the value of house at time t, Vt = PH,tHt, where PH,t is the price for one unit of
housing and Ht is the quantity of housing. Let Mt denote the home improvement expenditure at
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At steady state, we could obtain that m = (1 − α)δ. Denoting ss as structure share, it yields that
m = ssδ.
From the equilibrium we can obtain the following propositions of interest.
Proposition 1. The growth of structure that results from home improvement is a homogeneous
function of degree 1
α
> 1 of the relative ratio of housing price appreciation to structure cost growth.
Proposition 2. The rate of home improvement increases with housing price appreciation control-
ling for construction cost growth, and is negatively correlated with construction cost growth con-
trolling for housing price appreciation.
Proposition 3. The rate of home improvement increases with natural depreciation rate.
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Proposition 4. When housing price appreciation is greater than construction cost growth, the rate
of home improvement is negatively related to land share (positively related to the proportion of the
structure value).
2.5 Conclusion
Using American Housing Survey data on home improvement and maintenance expenditure, we are
able to perform a comprehensive investigations into the heterogeneity of home improvement and
maintenance activities that has not been well explored by literature. Speculating buyers (flippers)
spend significant higher amount on home improvement compared with non-speculating buyers
(non-flippers), and are more likely to perform major improvement. Households spend significantly
more following the home purchase rather than prior to resale. The spending of home improve-
ment and maintenance exhibits considerable variation across housing segments. In addition, there
is considerable regional variation. The paper enriches the literature on home improvement and
inspires future research.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Household Characteristic Mean Std.Dev Panel B: Property Characteristics Mean Std.Dev
Log income 10.96 1.53 Years since purchase 16.35 14.25
Household size 2.87 1.49 Sale in next 1 year 0.06 0.25
Number of kids 0.76 1.10 Purchased in previous 1 year 0.09 0.28
Household head age 51.24 15.01 Has mortgage 0.75 0.44
Female household head 0.38 0.49 Age of house 44.06 22.80
First time buying house 0.48 0.50 Rooms 6.51 1.59
Single 0.01 0.10 Bathrooms 1.85 0.75
Widowed 0.10 0.29 Bedrooms 3.17 0.83
Divorced 0.13 0.33 Square footage of unit 2,224 1,852




Other race 0.00 0.07 Spending per year ($)
Hispanice 0.10 0.31 Annual routine maintenance 811 1,280
Less than high school 0.09 0.29 Annual home improvement 2,882 10,408
High school graduate 0.21 0.41 Probability of spending (>$0)
Some college 0.26 0.44 Any routine maintenance? 0.79 0.41
College graduate 0.22 0.41 Any home improvement? 0.58 0.49
Post graduate 0.14 0.35 Any major home improvement? 0.13 0.34
Panel C: Household Spending
Note: Sample includes 62,740 observations in American Housing Survey between 1997 and 2011.  Real spending are 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 872 5,066 0.699 0.588 0.200
2 854 4,475 0.734 0.635 0.203
3 853 3,113 0.783 0.615 0.144
4 855 2,827 0.821 0.599 0.134
5 871 2,936 0.815 0.619 0.141
6 879 2,909 0.825 0.607 0.136
7 875 2,857 0.824 0.595 0.131
8 898 2,800 0.835 0.599 0.136
9 872 2,734 0.822 0.593 0.127
10 862 2,813 0.821 0.606 0.130
11-15 862 2,948 0.827 0.599 0.138
>15 676 2,068 0.741 0.533 0.099






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Home Improvement and Maintenance across Housing Segments
<50 50-100 100-150 150-250 250-350 350-500 500-1,000 >1,000
Home improvement per year  (as fraction of house value)
Mean 2.88% 1.88% 1.39% 1.21% 1.14% 1.15% 0.90% 0.41%
Std.Dev (0.070) (0.047) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.024) (0.011)
Routine maintenance per year (as fraction of house value)
Mean 1.64% 0.70% 0.47% 0.37% 0.28% 0.21% 0.17% 0.09%
Std.Dev (0.030) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Housing Value (in thousands, 2009 Dollars)
Note: This table reports the means and the standard deviation of two measures: (i) the annual home
improvement expense as a fraction of the house value; (ii) the annual routine maintenance expense as a fraction
of the house value. These statistics are computed for observations within the house value segments exhibited on
the top of the table. The data is from American Housing Survey National Sample 2009, restricted to owner-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Home Improvement and Maintenance and Land Share
Change in  Routine Maintenance 
Fraction (%)
Change in Home Improvement 
Fraction (%)
Change in Land Share -0.008*** -0.013**
(0.002) (0.007)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 255 255
Dependent Variable
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at msa level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Geographic Distribution of Average Routine Maintenance Expenditure, 2009
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Inequality, and the Affordability Crisis
3.1 Introduction
Food, clothing, and shelter are all considered to be basic needs. Yet, as Figure 3.1 Panel A shows,
from 1959 to 2014 the proportion of personal consumption expenditures in the United States de-
voted to food and clothing fell from 27.4 percent to 10.6 percent, while the fraction devoted to
housing and utilities rose from 16.1 to 18.1 percent. Data from the American Housing Survey and
Consumer Expenditure Survey indicate more dramatic increases in housing’s share: about 7 per-
centage points since 1970, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 Panel B. This growth has been even sharper
among renting households. Figure 3.1 Panel C shows that the percentage of renting households
facing “moderate” or “extreme” affordability burdens, defined as spending more than 30 or 50
percent of their income on housing, has risen by 20 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Mean-
while, the home-ownership rate has not seen a persistent rise. These trends support the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development’s recent claim: “We are in the midst of the worst rental af-
fordability crisis that this country has known” (Olick 2013).1 As mapped in Figure 3.2, this crisis
is particularly severe in in large cities and along the coasts.
The increasing share of expenditures on housing appears to contradict the traditional view
that housing is a necessity. On that view, the expenditure share on housing should have fallen as
1The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University (JHS (2013)) documents that from 2000 to 2012,
the median share of renters’ incomes devoted to contract rent rose nearly five percentage points to 27.4 percent, and
that 28 percent of renting households now spend more than half of their incomes on rent.Gyourko and Glaeser (2008)
present a thoughtful critique of affordability indices as well as a discussion of how rental expenditures have changed
over time.
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average incomes have risen over time. Another common assumption, that preferences over housing
relative to other goods are unit elastic in price and income (i.e., Cobb-Douglas), is also incapable of
explaining increases in un-affordability measures or their variation over space. Below, we consider
preferences and changes in the economy that explain both the rise in the housing expenditure share
over time, as well as the spatial variation in that share.
First and most important is that the price of housing relative to other goods has risen substan-
tially. Figure 3.3 Panel A shows that the price of housing (or shelter) services has risen almost 40
percent relative to other goods since 1970, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI). Critiques of the CPI suggest that the official series understates increases
in the relative price of shelter severely, while it overstates increases in the absolute prices of most
other goods and services. When we adopt revisions proposed by Crone et al. (2010) and Boskin
and Jorgenson (1996), the relative price of shelter has increased by 120 percent since 1970. If
housing demand is price inelastic, the large relative price increase of housing can help to explain
its rising share.
Second, rising income inequality has lowered median incomes relative to mean incomes, as
seen in Figure 3.3 Panel B. This phenomenon is particularly acute among renters, whose incomes
have seen weaker gains relative to homeowners. Thus, rising incomes have had smaller effects
for the majority of renters. Third, falling household sizes may have increased demand. Figure
3.3 Panel C shows that households have shrunk in size by almost 30 percent. This has reduced
economies of scale in housing consumption, thereby increasing per-capita demand for housing.2
To investigate these issues, we estimate housing demand using an intuitive framework moti-
vated by spatial equilibrium conditions. Section 3.3 demonstrates that cross-sectional data lends
itself to estimating compensated (Hicksian) housing demand functions, as mobility equalizes the
utility households receive from living in different locations. On the other hand, time-series data
2This increased demand requires that housing is indeed price inelastic. Of course, household sizes may be respon-
sive to incomes and prices. We leave the topic of endogenous household sizes to future work. Note the proportion of
children has fallen as the population has aged. Children under 18 accounted for nearly 24 percent of all household
members in 1970, but accounted for only 15 percent as of 2013. To the extent that adults desire more housing than
children do, this trend should have also raised housing expenditures.
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lends itself to uncompensated (Marshallian) demand functions, as utility levels may change over
time. An important innovation of our approach is that we use data on non-housing prices to test
restrictions imposed by demand theory, thus checking the validity of our specifications. This pro-
vides an unconventional examination of demand theory through spatial variation, rather than more
conventional temporal variation (e.g. Deaton (1986), Blundell et al. (1993)). We also estimate
household economies of scale in the spirit of Barten (1964), and develop methods for estimating
the direct effect of amenities on housing demand.
Under such restrictions, we integrate a demand equation into a utility function in the non-
homothetic constant elasticity-of-substitution (NH-CES) framework. This function should be use-
ful to researchers modeling housing consumption and provides cost-of-living indices across space
and time for different income, household sizes, and amenity levels, which account for income and
substitution effects.
Our compensated estimates suggest that the uncompensated own-price, income, and substitu-
tion elasticities are all near two-thirds in absolute value. Our tests suggest that estimates based on
cross-metropolitan (as opposed to within-metropolitan) variation are likely unaffected by house-
hold sorting, which in principle would bias the estimates away from zero. The quality of our
control for utility, based on the wage predicted by worker skills, cannot be fully tested, but likely
suffers from fewer biases than other measures.
We find some evidence of economies of scale in housing, in proportion to the square-root of
housing size. A 30-percent reduction in residents per household reduces household housing con-
sumption by only 15 percent, increasing per-capita consumption by the same percentage. Further-
more, estimates suggest that hilliness and hot weather may increase housing demand independently
of prices.
Time-series patterns are largely consistent with our cross-sectional results. With the adjusted
CPI, an elasticity of substitution slightly lower, or an income elasticity slightly higher than our esti-
mates — in the direction of our expected biases — would completely explain housing’s rising share
in national expenditure. Demographic effects reinforce these trends. Furthermore, rising rents and
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growing income equality explain most of the “affordability crisis” affecting renters. There may be
some residual increases in the housing share that warrants additional exploration.
We demonstrate numerically how an ideal cost-of-living index varies non-linearly with income
and prices across space and time. While the prices of many goods have become much cheaper
over time, housing rents do not appear to have made nearly as much progress. By differentially
impacting the poor, increases in the relative price of housing have increased real income inequality
by 25 percent since 1970.
3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
Our explanation of competing income and relative-price effects is illustrated in Figure 3.4, with
production possibility frontiers (PPF) and indifference curves for housing and non-housing goods.
Over time, the PPF has expanded further in the direction of non-housing goods: these goods are
traded internationally and are subject to greater technological improvements. With this expansion,
both income effects (illustrated from point A to point B) and relative-price effects (from B to C)
lead households to increase their consumption of non-housing goods more than of housing. The
income effect causes housing’s share to fall (compare B and D), but the rise in the relative price
causes housing’s share to rise if the substitution response is limited (compare C and E).
Previous researchers have estimated a wide range of price and income elasticities. Articles
reviewed in Mayo (1981) find uncompensated price elasticities from slightly positive to less than
minus one. Estimates closest to ours include Polinsky and Ellwood (1979)’s estimate of -0.7 and
Hausman (2001) experimental estimates of -0.64 in Pittsburgh and -0.45 in Phoenix.3 Classical
studies such as Engel (1857)and Schwabe (1868) estimated the income (or more precisely, expen-
3Other articles include Muth (1960), Reid (1962), Rosen (1985), Goodman and Kawai (1986), Goodman (1988),Er-
misch et al. (1996),Goodman (2002), and Ioannides and Zabel (2003). Most estimate uncompensated price elasticities
ranging from -1 to -0.3 and income elasticities from 0.4 to 1. While some studies use non-housing price data to deflate
their numbers, none use it to test the validity of the housing demand specification, as we do here. Few articles estimate
elastic price demand, with elasticities greater than one. Kau and Sirmans (1979) estimated price elasticity shifting
from -2.25 to -1 from year 1876 to 1970 using historical data from Chicago. However, these are based off land-price
gradients and are not robust to expected sorting behaviors described below.
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diture) elasticity of housing demand to be less than one, which became known as “Schwabe’s Law
of Rent”.4 As discussed in Mayo (1981), a source of contention is how to measure income: most
use a proxy measure of “permanent income" to correct for attenuation bias caused by transitory
income. Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) argue that the median expenditure share on rent across
metros — the evidence we focus on — is roughly constant across metro areas, consistent with
price and income elasticities of one.
Modelers have taken great latitude in interpreting such disparate findings. Indeed, housing
demand is key to understanding house prices, tax incidence, population density, and location de-
cisions. Many assume a fixed demand for housing, perfectly inelastic to price and income. This
provides a simple derivation of the mono-centric city model, seen from Mills (1967) to Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg (2013). Other models, such as the search and matching model of Piazzesi and
Schneider (2010), assume housing demand is inelastic to income but not to prices. Unit-elastic
demand — derived from Cobb-Douglas preferences — is especially common: examples include
Eeckhout (2004), Michaels et al. (2012), and Guerrieri et al. (2013). While abstraction is often
necessary, these disparate assumptions make it hard to reconcile different findings, and may lead
to incorrect conclusions in some contexts.
Indeed, the issue of housing “affordability,” especially as measured by high expenditure shares,
makes the most sense when demand is income- and price-inelastic. This is especially true for low-
income households, whose incomes have lagged particularly in America’s largest, most expensive
cities (Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013)). Low-skilled workers’ greater housing expenditure share
explains their choosing to live in cheaper cities (Moretti (2013)), while those remaining in expen-
sive cities must earn higher wage premia to do so relative to the premia required by more-skilled
workers (Black et al. (2009).5
4See Stigler (1954) for a discussion. As summarized by De Leeuw (1971), Mayo (1981) and later Harmon (1988),
some studies are inconsistent with Schwabe’s Law. See Hansen et al. (1998) and references therein for estimates less
than one, and Muth (1960) and Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) for an estimate greater than one, noting that the latter
study estimates elasticities for housing attributes rather than for a unified bundle.
5Handbury (2013) estimates a non-homothetic log-logit utility function with a CES superstructure to argue that
high-income households find large cities to be more “affordable” by containing a greater range of groceries suited to
their tastes. We find that large cities are more affordable for high-income households as they spend less on housing.
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The secular rise in housing expenditures appears to be understudied. It is in line with Piketty
(2014) finding that the value of residential capital relative to output rose substantially over the last
century.6 With inelastic demand for land in both consumption and production, land’s value can
take up an increasing share of the economy, reviving fears of Ricardo (1891) and George (1879).7
3.3 Housing Demand as Prices, Incomes, and Amenities Vary
Here we present a standard static model of housing demand embedded in a spatial equilibrium
framework with local household amenities, similar to the settings of Rosen (1985), Roback (1982),
and Albouy (2016). We derive expressions for the share of expenditure devoted to housing, which
motivate regressions to identify the parameters of the compensated and uncompensated housing
demand functions, amended to allow for variation in household size. We then construct utility and
cost-of-living functions that allow for imperfect substitution, non-homotheticity, varying house-
hold sizes, and variation in amenities.
3.3.1 Household Budgets and Preferences
The national economy contains many cities, indexed by j, which share a population of mobile
households, who supply one unit of labor where they live. They consume a housing good y
with price pj , and a non-housing good x with price cj .8 Households earn total income mj =
6Gyourko et al. (2013) find housing values’ differences between typical and highest-price locations widened con-
siderably since 1960. Rognlie (2016) shows that the postwar increase in the share of income flowing to capital is
largely concentrated in the housing sector, which La Cava (2016) shows is mainly due to higher imputed rental income
to owner-occupiers. Davis and Heathcote (2007)present evidence of persistent real growth in land values, accounting
for an increasing share of housing values. This evidence is consistent with limited substitution between land and non-
land inputs in housing production, as found in Albouy and Ehrlich (2018). We note that housing is a capital asset that
provides flow consumption services to its owner. This asset is a composite of land and structure, the latter of which
typically depreciates over time. We follow the bulk of the literature in estimating demand for a composite housing
good, but the shape of the housing demand function can have important implications for land values separately from
housing values.
7This may happen if land-saving technological improvements are weak or stifled by regulation. Thus, rising de-
mand may reverse earlier declines in land values engendered by transportation improvements.
8For simplicity, the exposition of the theoretical model will refer to a system of cities and call individual geo-
graphical units as such. However, the empirical work using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data will be at
a partly-disaggregated state level. Therefore, the geographies considered in this model are more properly considered
‘areas’, with the term ‘city’ used for concreteness.
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I+(1−τ)wj , determined by unearned income, I , which does not vary by city, and local wage levels
wj , after taxes, τ .9 Household preferences over the consumption good, housing, and location are
modeled by a utility function U(x, y;Qj), where Qj represents a city-specific amenity bundle con-
ceptualized as “quality-of-life”. The indirect utility function for a household in city j is then given
by V (pj, cj,mj;Qj) = maxx,y(U(x, y;Qj)|cjx+ pjy = (1− τ)wj + I). The expenditure function
for a household in city j is likewise given by e(pj, cj, u;Qj) = minx,y(cjx+pjy|U(x, y;Qj) ≥ u).
3.3.2 The Housing Expenditure Share and Uncompensated Demand
To take the model to the data, we approximate the relationships described above around their
national average values. Denote the fraction of household expenditures on housing in city j as
sjy ≡ (pjyj)/mj . Log-linearizing this equation produces the identity ŝjy = p̂j + ŷj − m̂j.10 We
assume that households take local price and income levels as given, so that the only behavioral
variable in sy is housing consumption, y, which is determined by the uncompensated (Marshallian)
demand function yj = y(pj, cj,mj;Qj). Log-linearizing demand, ŷj ≡ εy,pp̂j + εy,cĉj + εy,mm̂j +
εy,QQ̂
j. The parameter εy,p is the uncompensated own-price elasticity of housing demand, εy,c is the
uncompensated cross-price elasticity, εy,m is the income elasticity, and εy,Q is the amenity elaticity.
If housing is a normal good, then εy,m > 0, and housing obeys the law of demand that εy,p < 0.
It is a priori unclear whether housing is a gross substitute for non-housing goods, i.e., whether
εy,c > 0, because the cross-price elasticity exhibits a positive substitution effect and a negative
income effect, each of unknown magnitudes. Housing may be a gross complement or substitute
for amenities, i.e. εy,Q ≷ 0, if amenities alter the marginal rate of substitution between housing
and non-housing goods.
Combining the identities above demonstrates how the housing share depends on local variables:
ŝjy = (1 + εy,p)p̂
j + εy,cĉ
j + (εy,m − 1)m̂j + εy,QQ̂j (3.1)
9In this static setting, household expenditure equals household income.
10A hat over a variable represents its log deviation from the (geometric) national average, i.e., ẑj = d ln zj = dzj/z̄.
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Unrestricted, equation (3.1) is merely definitional. Rationality of preferences restricts the demand
function to be homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income (p, c,m), so that εy,p+εy,c+εy,m =
0. This restriction of “no money illusion” requires that proportional increases in all prices and
income do not lead to changes in behavior.11
Adding a constant and error term to equation (3.1) motivates these regression equations:
ln sjy = α0 + α1 ln p
j + α2 ln c
j + α3 lnm
j + α4q
j + ej (3.2a)
= α0 + α1(ln p
j − ln cj) + α3(lnmj − ln cj) + α4qj + ej (3.2b)
Equation (3.2b) follows from (3.2a) as homogeneity requires α1 + α2 + α3 = 0. If we subtract
the means of the right-hand side variables, the regression coefficients are related to the demand
parameters as: α0 = ln s̄y, α1 = 1 + εy,p, α2 = εy,c, and α3 = εy,m − 1. s̄y = eα0 is the
geometric mean of expenditure shares. The own-price uncompensated elasticity is the coefficient
on housing prices minus one, εy,p = α1 − 1; income elasticity is the coefficient on income plus
one, εy,m = α3 + 1.
Quality of life is not observed directly but is proxied by observable amenities, qj . Moreover,
we model εy,Q as a vector because differing amenities may shift housing demand differently.12
Consistent estimation of equation (3.2a) requires that non-housing goods are properly ac-
counted for by the index cj , that preferences across cities are the same, that preferences can be
aggregated, and that we have an appropriate (arguably permanent) measure of income mj .
3.3.3 Compensated Demand with Household Mobility and Heterogeneity
The uncompensated demand function is converted into a compensated (Hicksian) demand function
by substituting in the expenditure function, i.e. yH(p, c,m;Q) = y(p, c, e(p, c, u;Q);Q). Log-
11We do not model how households with low tastes for housing may be inclined to seek out more amenable areas
(see Black et al. (2002)). Albouy and Lue (2015) present evidence that household sizes, age, and marital status
vary little across metropolitan areas (they vary more within), suggesting such selection issues are not of first-order
importance. While discussed more below, our rationality test appears to rule out large amounts of sorting.
12A priori we are unsure, nice climates could induce households to spend more of their time on the properties or
away from them. Zivin and Neidell (2014) estimate the extent to which extreme heat and cold pushes people indoors.
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linearizing the expenditure function directly yields the mobility condition that local incomes will
compensate for local prices and quality of life, conditional on utility:
m̂j = s̄yp̂
j + (1− s̄y)ĉj + εm,QQ̂j + εm,uûj (3.3)
where εm,u is the elasticity of expenditures with respect to utility, and εm,Q is the elasticity of
expenditures with respect to quality of life.
Substituting equation (3.3) into equation (3.1) and simplifying by the Slutsky equations gives
the following relationships among the uncompensated (Marshallian) and compensated (Hicksian)
price elasticities: εy,p = εHy,p−s̄yεy,m and εy,c = εHy,c−s̄xεy,m. Here εHy,p and εHy,c are the compensated
elasticities of housing demand with respect to housing and non-housing prices, respectively.13
Rationality requires that compensated demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices,
implying the own and cross-price elasticities sum to zero, εHy,p + ε
H
y,c = 0.
Combining these insights yields the following equation for differences in the expenditure share
in terms of relative prices, quality of life, and utility:
ŝjy = (ε
H
y,p + 1− s̄y)(p̂j − ĉj) + (εHy,u − εm,u)ûj + (εHy,Q − εm,Q)Q̂j (3.4)
Here εHy,Q is the compensated elasticity of housing demand with respect to quality of life and ε
H
y,u
is a similar elasticity for income.
We assume that similarly-skilled households are equally well-off across cities. When house-
holds are mobile, households should be indifferent across locations they inhabit, and utility by type
of household will not vary across cities. Rather, utility differences will represent inherent differ-
ences across households, such as different earnings potentials. We parameterize income in city j
as mj = ζjwj , where ζj is an index of wage-earning skills, and wj is the city-wide wage level that
13The first substitution yields ŝjy = (1 + εy,p − s̄y + s̄yεy,m)p̂j + [εy,c − (1 − εy,m)(1 − s̄y)]ĉj + (εy,Q − (1 −
εy,m)εm,Q)Q̂
j − (1 − εy,m)εm,uûj . Besides the Slutsky equations we also substitute in the identities εHy,Q = εy,Q +
εy,mεm,Q and εHy,u = εy,mεm,u to get the resulting equation.
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compensates households for living in that city.14
To interpret the coefficient, we posit that our utility function is money metric around national
averages: u(x, y;Q) = e(p̄, c̄, ũ(x, y;Q), Q). This normalization allows us to write utility differ-
ences in terms of differences in the skill index ûj = ζ̂j , and impose εm,u = 1 and εHy,u = εy,m.
15
This motivates a compensated empirical model that replaces income in (3.2a) with a skill index:




j + ej (3.5a)
= β0 + β1(p̂
j − ĉj) + β3ζ̂j + β4qj + ej (3.5b)
where β0 = ln s̄y, β1 = εHy,p+1−sy = −β2 and β3 = εy,m−1. In practice, ζ̂j is an index estimated
from the average log wages households would earn in a typical city based on their human capital
and other location-invariant characteristics.
The main testable restriction is that β1 + β2 = 0, which may be seen as a joint test of both
demand theory and mobility.16 When this restriction holds, the elasticity of substitution between
housing and non-housing goods is σD ≡ −(ŷj − x̂j)/(p̂j − ĉj) = −εHy,p/(1 − s̄y), so that β1 =
(1− s̄y)(1− σD). When σD is less (greater) than one, housing demand is said to be price inelastic
(elastic), and the expenditure share of housing rises (falls) with the relative price of housing, p/c.
An advantage of the compensated specification is that it estimates the elasticity of substitution
without reference to income, which our skill-index may not fully capture.
The general prediction for neutral quality-of-life amenities, with εy,Q = 0, is that they are net
substitutes for housing. However, when housing is a necessity, they increase the housing share
as households take lower real incomes to live in more amenable areas: εHy,Q − εm,Q = −(1 −
εy,m)εm,Q < 0. With an estimate of εm,Q — available from methods in Rosen (1979) or Albouy
14When household types vary within city, the compensating wage differences will vary according to their tastes for
housing, quality of life, and taxes.
15Note that we implicitly impose the restriction that the skill index affects housing consumption through income, and
not through differences in tastes. If households with more skills like housing less (more) than those with fewer skills,
the income elasticity estimate will be biased downwards (upwards). Our index also does not handle how earnings over
the life-cycle may differ from permanent income.
16If mobility does not hold, then the coefficients would not be of equal magnitudes. Income effects in the uncom-
pensated elasticities would likely push coefficients on both housing and non-housing prices downwards.
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(2008) — the uncompensated effect of an amenity on housing demand is calculated by netting out
this implied income effect using the formula εy,Q = β4 + β3εm,Q.
3.3.4 Economies of Scale in Housing Consumption
Shared living quarters make housing consumption partly non-rival in nature. This “non-congestibility,”
proposed by Barten (1964), and explored by Deaton and Paxson (1998), can have potentially large
price and income effects on housing demand. Here we sketch how to incorporate non-congestibility
in the demand framework. The uncompensated demand function for housing per household mem-








where ỹ is the housing demand function for a single-member household, and m/n is income per
capita. The parameter φ governs the degree to which housing is congestible: φ = 1 implies that
housing is a purely congestible (or private) good. Log-linearizing this equation shows how the log
expenditure share varies with prices, houshold size, and log income per capita, m̂− n̂:
ŝy = (εy,p + 1) p̂+ (εy,w − 1) (m̂− n̂)− (εy,p + εy,m)ĉ− (1− φ) [εy,p + 1] n̂ (3.7a)
= α1 (p̂− ĉ) + α3(m̂− n̂− ĉ) + αnn̂ (3.7b)
It then follows that congestibility φ = 1 + αn/α1 ∈ [0, 1]. Note this places a restriction on
the estimates that 0 ≥ αn ≥ −α1. In the appendix we demonstrate an analogous framework
for compensated demand, with φ = 1 + βn/β1 ∈ [0, 1]. The compensated framework is less
appropriate for dealing with differences in household size given our use of the skill index in light
of endogenous labor supply and household size choices.
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3.3.5 Non-Homothetic Utility, Housing Share, and Cost-of-Living
Functions
To allow the housing share to vary with both prices and income, we use the non-homothetic sep-
arable family CES (NH-CES) function from Sato (1977). Unlike other utility functions, it neatly
separates out a substitution parameter σ, from a non-homotheticity parameter, γ, as well as a dis-
tribution parameter δ. We amend the function for household congestion, φ and neutral shifts in
quality of life, Q:
U(x, y;n,Q) = Q
δ (yn1−φ)σ−1σ + θ1




where θ1 = [1−σ−γδ]/(γσ) and θ2 = [1−σ−γ(δ−1)]/(γσ). This function becomes a standard
CES function (Arrow et al. (1961)) as γ → 0, and Cobb and Douglas (1928) if also σ → 1. We
show in the appendix that the housing share and cost-of-living index associated with this utility
function are:






























When γ(1−σ) > 0, households with higher utility consume less in housing, and need less income
to compensate them for rises in p. Our restricted log-linear model maps to this utility function:
when the right-hand side variables are demeaned, β0 = σ ln δ = ln s̄y, β1 = (1 − s̄y)(1 − σ), and
β3 = −γ(1 − s̄y)(1 − σ)/εm,u, where εm,u is the expenditure elasticity with respect to u. The
parameters are determined recursively with σ = 1− β1/(1− eβ0), δ = eβ0/σ, γ = −εm,uβ3/β1.17
The cost-of-living index in (3.8c) requires that prices p and c are expressed in proportion to a
reference level of prices p̄ and c̄. Furthermore, with a value of σ and a reference value for s̄y, e.g.,
17Because the units of u and γ are not separately identified, we impose the restriction, COL(1, 1, u;n,Q) = 1 to
solve for γ and u/Q simultaneously.
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the national average, the distribution parameter is set to δ = {1 + [s̄y/(1 − s̄y)](1/σ)}−1. We can
incorporate a reference utility level for any household based on its housing consumption siy and its









of life measures, Q, may be estimated using methods described in Albouy (2008).
3.3.6 Addressing Potential Biases in Elasticity Estimates
Several potential biases can arise in the estimation of the price and income elasticities of housing
demand. Regarding the price elasticity, our approach corrects for potential biases that may arise
from omitting non-housing prices, skill levels, and home-ownership. Additionally, the focus on
cross-metro variation limits potential biases due to taste-based sorting.
Figure 3.5 A shows that non-housing prices vary positively with housing prices. Suppose
ĉj = ρp̂j + vj , where ρ > 0 and vj is white noise. Substituting this projection into equation 3.5b,
together with the elasticity of substitution, σD, gives that σ̂D = 1 − β1/[(1 − eβ0)(1 − ρ)]. Thus,
the higher is ρ, the more ignoring non-housing prices biases σ̂D upwards.
Omitting the skill level of workers, ζj , can also bias estimates. As seen in Figure 3.5 B,
higher-skilled households locate slightly more in high-rent areas.18 If housing is a necessity, these
households will exhibit a smaller housing share. Thus, higher-price areas have a low housing share
relative to their rent level without this control, biasing estimated substitutability upward.
Another bias may stem from housing tenure selection. Suppose the propensity to rent rises
with rent levels (possibly due to financing constraints), so that skilled households rent more in
expensive cities. If housing is a necessity, and controls for skills (or utility) are incomplete, this
could bias substitution elasticities upward. This suggests a control for the home-ownership rate.
Finally, there is the issue of unobserved taste-based sorting. Households that care more for
housing should sort to areas where rents are low, negatively biasing the expenditure-rent gradient
towards finding higher substitution. Such sorting behavior would likely cause the homogeneity
18Moretti (2013) finds a stronger skill-rent relationship using education only. Our measure includes race, experience,
immigration status, and language ability.
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restrictions to fail. To check, we compare estimates using rent variation across metros with those
using variation within metros, where sorting is more likely. Nonetheless, this potential bias leads
us to view our estimates of the elasticity of substitution as an upper bound on the true value.
The main concern in estimating the income elasticity of housing demand is attenuation bias
from using current-period income. Indeed, our data include numerous observations for which rent
paid exceeds reported income. Taking metro-level medians should greatly reduce biases produced
by measurement error and transitory income. Nevertheless, cities themselves may be subject to
transitory income shocks. The wage index measure is purged of any location effects and should
suffer far less from these issues. It is still limited in that it only captures a snapshot of earnings
over the life cycle.19 Therefore, we view our preferred estimate of the income elasticity as a lower
bound on the actual elasticity.
3.3.7 The Housing Share, or “Affordability” as a Measure of Welfare
What housing shares, sy, tell us about well-being or affordability hinges on the nature of the
demand function. Housing must be a necessity for large shares to signal low well-being; it must
be price inelastic for high shares to indicate high prices. But if households are mobile, high prices
should reflect high wages or high quality of life. A household in an unsafe area with bad schools
and long commutes may spend little on housing, but still be worse off than a household spending
a larger share in an area with better amenities. If households are immobile, then high shares may
indicate lower welfare, although differing amenities and tastes still complicate analysis.20
19Classical measurement error in income implies that we observe m̂j∗ = m̂j +ηj , where ηj is white noise. Defining
λ = 1 − var(ηj)/var(m̂j∗|p̂j , ĉj) as the reliability ratio, conditional on the other variables, the OLS estimate of α3
will give λ(α3 + 1) − 1, and the inferred value of εy,m is attenuated classically to zero by the factor λ. Haider and
Solon (2006) estimate that as a measure of lifetime earnings, λ peaks in the middle of the life cycle at a value of about
two-thirds.
20Additionally, elderly households, particularly homeowners, may consume high amounts of housing because they
have not adjusted from when their households were once larger.
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3.4 Data
The primary data source for our cross-sectional analysis is the 2000 Decennial Census microdata
samples from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. (2010)).21 These data generate metro-level indices of in-
come, mj , predicted income, ζj , the rental-price index, pj , and the housing share, sjy, as explained
below. For the price of non-housing goods, we use a series from Carrillo et al. (2013), or “CEO,”
who construct the series from data by the American Chambers of Commerce Research Associa-
tion (ACCRA).22 In our time series analyses, we combine data from several sources. The 1970,
1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial Censuses and 2001 through 2014 American Community Surveys
provide data on the housing share, as do the 1984-2014 Consumer Expenditures Surveys (CEX)
and personal consumption expenditures data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the years
1970 to 2014. Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1970 to 2014 provide data on house-
hold size and composition, and Consumer Price Index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
from the same years provide information on relative prices. The CPI for shelter from the BLS is
based on observed rents, and rents imputed for owned units using a rental-equivalence approach.23
The index is chain-weighted, accounting for changes in the geographic distribution of occupied
houses. The BEA measure of housing expenditures imputes rental-equivalent measures for owner-
occupied units. From the CEX, we take measures of average rental expenditures relative to all
expenditures. Both datasets include owner-occupiers.24
21In the appendix we also consider the 1980 and 1990 Censuses and the combined 2007-2011 American Community
Survey (ACS). Each represents 5 percent of the U.S. population. The metro-level indices are calculated for Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Areas using 1999 Office of Management and Budget definitions. The Public-Use files are
available for Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), are matched to metropolitan areas using standard geographic
correlation techniques, which attempt to preserve the geography over different cross-sectional samples.
22These data begin in 1982, and so we use 1982 values for our 1980 specification.
23The index is based primarily on a re-weighting procedure. The rental portion of the index may suffer from a
downward bias, discussed in Crone et al. (2010).
24We use total expenditures as the denominator rather than income when we use the CEX, as it is closer to the ideal
presented in the model.
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3.4.1 Rental and Housing Expenditure Shares
We focus on median rental expenditure shares. Expenditures for owner-occupiers are complicated
by difficulties in measuring user costs of housing and complications from savings. The rental
share is the ratio of gross rents (including utility costs) to reported household income. Median
shares circumvent aggregation issues and mitigate measurement problems such as under-reporting
income, which can create very high shares for low income households.25
3.4.2 Price and Wage Indices
To calculate cross-sectional rental and house-price indices, we run regressions of the form ln(P ij) =
αP + βPX
ij + δjP + ε
ij
P , where P
ij is the rent or imputed rent for unit i in area j. X ijP is a vector
of housing-unit characteristics described in the appendix.26 The estimated area indicators, δjP , act
as our inter-area housing price indices, pj . To estimate a skill index, we run the wage regression






W , where Wij is the hourly wage for person i in area j. X
W
ij is
a vector of personal characteristics, and δWj is a set of area fixed effects. The skill index ζ
j is from
the corresponding moment (e.g., median or mean) of the β̂WX
ij
W .
27 The appendix covers additional
indices for robustness.
25We also consider average and aggregate expenditure shares, equal to the sum of all rental payments divided by
the sum of all tenant income. We consider two possible expenditure measures for owner-occupiers. The first is total
monthly payments (or “cash-flow”) related to housing, including mortgages, property taxes, and utilities. While this
measure is appropriate for a static environment, it may diverge significantly from the true user-cost due to expected
capital gains, mortgage terms, and net improvements relative to (unobserved) depreciation and maintenance costs.
Most importantly, we do not observe income from home equity, which belongs on both the expenditure and income
side of the equation. We also consider a measure of self-reported housing values relative to household income. Ideally,
we would be able to model the decision to rent or own.
26We impute rents using the variable OWNCOST from the IPUMS microdata, which is the sum of mortgage and
similar payments, real estate taxes, hazard insurance, utilities and fuels expenses, and condominium and mobile home
fees where appropriate. When the regression includes both rented and owned units, XijP includes tenure status inter-
acted with every characteristic.
27Thus, raw wage differences across cities are the product of differences due to the area itself – compensating wage
differentials for costs-of-living and amenities – and the local skills of the workforce, summarized by the wage index.
Additional specifications use the average predicted values from the wage regressions.
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3.5 Empirical Results
This section describes our estimates of the housing demand function. The heart of our estimation
strategy, in Table 3.1 and 3.2 , is to use cross-sectional variation across U.S. metropolitan areas.
Table 3.3 displays the results from aggregate time series data.
3.5.1 Cross-sectional Evidence
Price and Income Elasticities: Estimates and Robustness
Table 3.1 presents metro-level estimates using the compensated model from equation (3.5b), using
the log median rental share as the dependent variable in columns 1-4. Column 1 displays the results
of a simple regression of the log median rental share on the rental price index, recovering a median
expenditure share, sy, of 22.5 percent, and an implied price elasticity, εy,p of -0.83.28
Figure 3.6 Panel A and Panel B illustrate the inter-metropolitan relationship between median
expenditure shares and relative prices in the Census data. Figure 3.6 Panel A includes renters only,
while Panel B includes both renters and owners.29 The regression line has slope β1 = −β2 in
equation (3.5b), with β3 = β4 = 0 imposed. Both slopes are positive and statistically significant,
indicating demand is price-inelastic: expenditure shares are higher in areas with more expensive
housing. Figure 3.6 Panel B features a steeper slope and a tighter fit, although the housing share
for home owners includes net investments and excludes implicit rents. The slope may be biased
for more reasons than discussed above.
As expected, the coefficient on rents, β1, increases when the non-housing price index and the
skill index are included in column 2 of Table 3.1 . The implied price and income elasticities are -0.7
and 0.7, respectively. A test of the homogeneity of demand does not reject the null hypothesis that
β1 = −β2. Therefore, our preferred specification in column 3 imposes homogeneity of demand,
recovering an elasticity of substitution, σD, of 0.69. The results in column 4 are largely unaffected
28More technically, sy is the geometric mean of the median expenditure share across metro areas.
29Accordingly, the former uses a price-index for rental units and the latter an index for all housing units.
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by controlling for local home-ownership rates, suggesting that unobserved determinants of renter-
ship do not bias our estimates.30
Column 5 uses the out-of-pocket expenditure share of home-owners as the dependent variable,
while column 6 includes owners and renters, as in Figure 3.6 Panel B. The estimates in these
columns imply smaller income and price elasticities than the results that are restricted to renters.
The results in column 5 fail the homogeneity restriction, casting doubt on the reliability of the
results that include homeowners, for whom it is more difficult to measure the theoretically appro-
priate concept of rents.31 Column 7 uses the aggregate rental share, thereby weighting households
in proportion to their expenditures. The results are similar to column 3, with slightly higher elas-
ticities.
Column 8 presents results using within-metro variation at the PUMA level to examine house-
hold sorting. This specification suggests a lower income and higher price elasticity. The specifica-
tion fails the homogeneity test, however, suggesting that either the non-housing cost data are not
reliable within metros or that taste-sorting is biasing the estimates.
Overall, our preferred estimates in column 3 reveal an uncompensated price elasticity of roughly
-2/3, an income elasticity near 2/3 and an elasticity of substitution near 2/3. Furthermore, the ho-
mogeneity restriction holds when using proper rental measures, even after controlling for home-
ownership, suggesting our compensated demand framework based on household mobility is a use-
ful estimation strategy.
Household Size and Local Amenities
Table 3.2 incorporates household-size effects and local amenities both into the compensated de-
mand specification in the previous section and into estimates of uncompensated regression equa-
30Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011)’s data for metro areas support an elasticity of substitution of 0.85. However,
their index of rental costs differs from ours by controlling for commuting costs, and thus exaggerates the actual price
differences faced by households (e.g. that suburban dwellers in the New York suburbs face Manhattan prices), biasing
their results towards one. Their study does not account for income or non-housing prices.
31We have also tried imputing rents by adding utility to costs to a percentage of self-reported home values based on
user costs. That percentage is either a uniform 6.2 percent, consistent with Albouy and Hanson (2014). The results
are qualitatively similar, except that the specification in column 6 also fails the homogeneity test.
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tions modeled after equation (3.2a). The uncompensated regressions include a measure of house-
hold income per capita instead of the skill index in the compensated regressions, which proxies for
earnings potential.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results of unrestricted Marshallian regression equations that include
measures of household income per capita and household size as suggested by (3.7b), with an ad-
ditional control for the fraction of household residents under the age of 18, following Deaton and
Paxson (1998). The estimated price and income elasticities are somewhat smaller in column 1 than
in the previous table. Although the specification in column 1 passes the homogeneity test easily, we
remain suspicious of the estimated income elasticity, which is based on contemporaneous income,
and therefore likely to be biased downward. The coefficient on log household size is negative: con-
trolling for per-capita income, larger households consume less housing per capita. Combined with
the price elasticity, the implied congestibility of housing is approximately 0.5, halfway between a
pure public good and a pure private good within the household.32
Column 2 includes six commonly measured metropolitan amenities taken from Albouy (2008)Al-
bouy (2008): mild winters, cool summers, sunshine, coastal proximity, hilliness, and clean air.
Each is re-normalized in standard deviations and signed so that a positive value is supposed to in-
crease utility. None of the amenities is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.33 The addition
of so many amenities appears to have saturated the model to the point where the price and income
estimates no longer satisfy homogeneity, which may be the result of imperfect measurement and
the Iron Law of Econometrics (Hausman (2001)).
Columns 3 and 4 consider compensated models that incorporate household size and composi-
tion effects. They replace the skill index with a skills-per-capita index. The coefficient on house-
hold size is slightly smaller than in column 1 and less precise. Indeed, it is no longer statistically
significantly different from zero, perhaps reflecting the greater difficulties of applying a Barten-
style model in a compensated demand framework. The implied congestion parameter is small, but
32Intriguingly, this estimate is not far from equivalence scales that suggest using the square root of household size
(OECD 2008), although here we only consider housing.
33Cool summers and coastal proximity are significant at the 10-percent level.
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is not distinguishable from the earlier value of 0.5 at normal significance levels.
In column 4, we see stronger evidence that some amenities may impact housing demand. The
typically positive coefficients provide indirect evidence that housing is a necessity, as higher ameni-
ties should reduce real money incomes holding utility constant. Indeed, the estimates in column
5 show the results of a regression of estimated quality of life, adapted from Albouy (2008), on
the regressors from column 4.34 The estimates confirm that all of these amenities increase the
willingness-to-pay of households to live in a given area. A one standard deviation increase in each
amenity appears to lower real income between 0.6 percent, in the case of clean air, and 2.5 percent,
in the case of proximity to the coast.
Once the income effects of these amenities are netted out, as seen in column 6, their effects on
housing demand are more striking. The effect of the average slope of the land, or “hilliness”, is
decidedly stronger than in column 2, suggesting that households may indeed demand larger houses
in hilly areas after controlling for the higher prices there. This could be due to residents wanting to
take advantage of better views from their homes, or enjoying the greater visibility of their homes.
Furthermore, there is stronger evidence that housing demand in places with extreme heat also tends
to be greater. This pattern may arise if heat induces residents to spend more time on their property,
indoors or out. One caution with the amenity estimates is that they are based on a regression that
no longer satisfies the homogeneity restriction, perhaps from multi-collinearity among regressors.
Although they stretch the limits of the data, we view the results of Table 3.2 as broadly con-
sistent with our preferred results in Table 3.1 . There is some evidence that housing is a partially
public good within the household, with a congestibility parameter of about one half. There is
also suggestive evidence that some amenities, like hilliness and extreme heat, increase demand for
housing.
34This is based on a regression of a quality of life/willingness-to-pay index on the observed amenities. Following
Albouy (2008), this index balances costs-of-living relative to after-tax nominal income gains given by Q̂j = syp̂j +
scĉ
j − (1 − τ)swŵj , where τ is the marginal tax rate, sw is the average income share from labor, and ŵj is the
estimated impact of location j on renters’ wages.
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3.5.2 Time Series Evidence
Time Series Estimates
Table 3.3 presents uncompensated demand estimates using the time series data presented in Fig-
ure 3.1 and Figure 3.3 for the years 1970-2014. These specifications use nominal prices and
incomes, and thus (perhaps ambitiously) estimate an inflation index that balances housing versus
non-housing goods from the observed behavior of households. We consider two different indices
for the relative price of housing. The first uses the BLS’s official measures, while the second
incorporates the revisions proposed by Boskin and Jorgenson (1996) and Crone et al. (2010).
We focus on restricted models satisfying homogeneity of degree zero in prices and income,
which are not rejected by formal tests in our preferred specifications. The specifications include
two additional terms. One is a linear time trend, t, that may capture secular changes in household
preferences, for instance due to cohort effects, or increasing complementarity with local amenities
as households have shifted locations.35 The second term is the logarithm of household size, ln(n).
The multi-collinearity between prices, incomes, and household size pushes the limit of what the
time-series can identify.
Estimates from the BEA numbers with the official CPI, shown in column 1, imply an own-price
elasticity of -0.55, an income elasticity of 0.61, and household size effect of -0.36. These are not
far from the uncompensated estimates in Table 3.2 and pass the homogeneity test. The estimated
time trend is 0.007 per year, which we suspect may come from an under-estimate of the income
elasticity. This result is consistent with the findings of Aguiar and Hurst (2013). The coefficient
on log household size suggests a low degree of congestibility in housing demand.
The estimates in column 2, which use the revised relative price index, suggest larger price
and income elasticities that are even closer to the cross-sectional estimates, but nonetheless still
pass the homogeneity restriction. They also exhibit a similar estimated time trend, although the
coefficient on log household size becomes positive, contrary to intuition and our previous results.
35The time trend may also reflect simple measurement error resulting from limitations in the data and its ability to
identify low-frequency responses in housing consumption from shifting prices and income.
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Columns 3 and 4 use the expenditure shares from the CEX for renters. These estimates are
less precise and produce income and substitution elasticities much closer to one. Using the revised
relative price index does not change the estimates substantially. Again, the estimated time trend
is about 0.01 per year. The estimated coefficients on log household size are too imprecise to draw
meaningful conclusions about the congesitibility of housing demand.
Explaining Changes in the Housing Share over Time
In Table 3.4 , we decompose the growing share of income spent on housing discussed in the
introduction. Rearranging (3.4) and replacing Q with n and t, we have
ŝy = (1− s̄y + εHy,p)(p̂− ĉ) + (εy,m − 1)[(m̂− ĉ)− s̄y(p̂− ĉ)] + αnn̂+ αtt+ e (3.9)
The first component represents the change due to the pure compensated price effect. This effect is
positive when the relative price of housing increases if σ < 1, as 1− sy + εHy,p = (1− sy)(1− σ).
The second component is the income effect, from a parallel rise in the budget set, making the
proper adjustment for changes in relative prices. The third component, αnn̂, accounts for changes
in household size; the fourth, αtt, the estimated time trend; and the fifth, e, is a residual.
Table 3.4 explains the overall increase in the log housing share of 6.7 percent (just under 2
percentage points) in the BEA numbers from 1970 to 2014. Column 1 uses parameters close to our
preferred cross-sectional estimates in column 3 of Table 3.1 , with an elasticity of substitution and
income elasticity of housing demand of two-thirds. The congestibility parameter φ is taken to be
one-half, in line with the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 . The specification incorporates
the CPI numbers revised for both the CNV and Boskin critiques. The compensated price effect
accounted for a nearly 23 percentage point increase in the housing share under this specification,
while the income effect reduced it by by nearly 45 points. Shrinking household sizes also pushed
up the housing share by 4 points. Nonetheless, the parameters from the cross-sectional estimates
leave a large part of the increase in the housing share unexplained, as relatively easy substitution
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from housing to other goods leaves the compensated relative price effect outweighed by a large
income effect.
Column 2 parametrizes the numbers by shading our estimates slightly in the direction where
biases are most likely: thus σD = 0.5 < 0.667, and εy,m = 0.833 > 0.667. φ is kept at 0.5.
Column 2 also uses the CPI numbers revised for both the CNV and Boskin critiques. Under this
specification, the relative price effect and the household size effect combine to explain an increase
in the housing share of over 39 points. After the subtracting the income effect, the net effect is
17 points, slightly over-predicting the observed change of nearly 7 points, which is left in the
time trend and residual. Thus, only modest changes to our cross-sectional parameter estimates are
necessary to produce the observed increase in housing’s share of expenditure.
Column 3 maintains the revised relative price index but uses the parameters estimated from the
time series evidence in column 2 of Table 3.3 . The primary difference from the cross-sectionally
estimated parameters is that the household congestion parameter is larger than one, contrary to
what would be predicted by theory. Accordingly, the decrease in average household size led to
an 8 point increase in the housing share in this specification, reducing the specification’s ability to
explain the increase in the housing share.
Column 4 uses our preferred parametrization from column 2 in combination with the official
CPI. Using the official CPI implies both a smaller increase in the relative price of housing and
slower growth in real incomes. The income effect’s weaker tendency to decrease the housing
share outweighs the price effect’s weaker tendency to increase it, leading to a predicted change of
approximately zero under these parameters. Column 5 uses the parameters from the time series
estimates in column 1 of Table 3.3, which also use the official CPI. The income effect predicts a
very large fall in the housing share, which is offset only partially by a small price effect.
Finally, column 6 applies our preferred parametrization from column 2 along with the revised
CPI to the CEX data from 1984 to 2014. The CEX data show a much larger increase in the
housing share, of nearly 24 percent. Notably, the income effect is very small in the CEX data, as
real incomes grew just 24 percent. Together, the relative price effect and slight decrease in average
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household size can account for just over half of the observed increase in the housing share in this
specification.
Overall, the results in Table 3.4 indicate that economic fundamentals are able to account for the
observed increase in housing’s share of expenditure since 1970 when Boskin and Jorgenson (1996)
and Crone et al. (2010) critiques of the official CPI are considered. Slight modifications to reflect
the likely biases in our cross-sectional estimates of the housing demand function are sufficient to
explain more than the entirety of the observed increase in the housing share.
3.6 Applying Estimates of Housing Demand
3.6.1 Changes in Housing Affordability, 1970 to 2010
Table 3.5 shows that since 1970, the percentage of households facing “extreme” (over 50 percent)
housing affordability burdens rose from 16 to 28 percent, while the share facing “moderate” (over
30 percent) burdens rose from 30 to 53 percent. The median expenditure share devoted to rent rose
from 20 to 31 percent in that time.
To explain this decline in affordability, we consider five separate trends in the economy from
1970 to 2010. First is the change in household composition and age structure. We consider this
demographic change by dividing households into 36 categories household type and age categories,
defined by the mean age of adults.36 The 2010 sample is re-weighted so that these groups have the
same proportion as in 1970.
The second trend is the increase in income inequality, which has pushed the income of renters
down relative to average incomes. To assess this effect, we construct a counterfactual income dis-
tribution that assigns each household the income it would have earned if all incomes had increased
proportionally between 1970 and 2010.37 We denote household i’s counterfactual income m̃i. We
36We define the six household types as one adult without children, one adult with children, two adults without
children, two adults with children, three or more adults without children, and three or more adults with children. We
define the six age categories as 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+, where age is defined as the mean age of
the adults.
37Formally, we calculate household incomes at each percentile, k = 1, ..., 100 for years t = 1970, 2010, mkt , as
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multiply ln(m̃i/mi) by the income effect εy,m − 1 to determine increasing income inequality’s
effect on household i’s log income share devoted to housing (εy,m − 1) ln(m̃i/mi).
Third, we consider increasing rental dispersion across metro areas, as in Moretti (2013). In-
creased dispersion will reduce affordability if rent increases happen disproportionately in areas
with more renters. We assume that households’ incomes are compensated for relative price in-





Fourth, following our previous analysis, we consider changes in average real incomes from
1970 to 2010. The income effect on housing demand is the change in average income, after ac-
counting for the change in non-housing prices, times the income effect, εy,m−1. We consider both
the official and revised CPI in these calculations.
Fifth and finally, we consider changes in the national average rent level. We calculate what
affordability would have been if average rents had not increased from 1970 to 2010 using the
uncompensated price elasticity of housing demand to account for the behavioral response through
the formula (εy,p + 1) ln(p̄1970/p̄2010). Lower rents increase affordability provided that εy,p > −1.
We again consider the official and revised CPI in these calculations.
Table 3.5 accounts for these factors’ contributions to the 22 and 12 percentage point increases
in households facing moderate and extreme affordability burdens, respectively, as well as the 11
point increase in the median expenditure share among renters from 1970 to 2010. We consider
two of the parametrizations from Table 3.4 . The first uses income and substitution elasticities of
two-thirds each, close to our estimated values; the second uses an elasticity of substitution of 0.5
and an income elasticity of 0.833.
The change in household composition had small effects under both parametrizations, reducing
the share of households facing an extreme burden by 0.8 percentage points but having a negligi-
ble effect on the other two measures. Widening income inequality had larger effects on moderate
than extreme burdens, increasing them by 2.9 and 1.0 points, respectively, in the first parametriza-






38Using uncompensated regressions would create a lower response. We use contemporary population distributions
to calculate relative price changes.
87
tion, and by half as much in the second. Changes in rent dispersion did disproportionately impact
renters, although increasing dispersion explains less than a one point increase in affordability bur-
dens in either parametrization.
The largest drivers of affordability burdens are increases in average incomes and average rents.
The income effects are muted using the official CPI because real incomes changed little. The
increase in average relative rents drives 5.8 and 3.2 point increases in moderate and extreme bur-
dens under the first parametrization, and somewhat larger increases of 7.6 and 4.3 points under the
second.
Using the revised CPI, the increase in average incomes has a much larger impact, as implied
real incomes rose considerably faster than under the official CPI. Under the first parametrization,
rising real incomes accounted for 6.1 and 0.2 point decreases in the affordability burdens, while
under the second, the implied reductions in the affordability burdens were 3.0 and 1.8 percent. The
change in average relative rents is much more pronounced using the revised CPI, explaining 13.3
and 5.5 point increases in the affordability burdens using the first parametrization, which increase
to 16.3 and 9.3 points under the second.
Taken together, the five factors we consider explain more than 70 percent of the increase
in housing affordability burdens from 1970 to 2010 using the revised CPI under our preferred
parametrization.
3.6.2 Utility and Expenditure Functions
The estimates from the previous sections are sufficient to identify the utility and expenditure func-
tions in section 3.3.5. For illustration, we round the parameters based off of estimates from column
3 of Table 3.1 , setting σ = 2/3, δ = 1/8, γ = 4/3, and φ = 1/2. Using these values in equations






















The units of x and y are median income shares for renters, with baseline values of x = 0.78 and
y = 0.22. We hope these functions will have direct applicability to quantitative models in urban,
macro, or public economics involving the housing sector.39
3.6.3 Cost-of-Living Indices over Space and Time
The estimated housing demand parameters may be used to calculate realistic cost-of-living indices
(COLIs). We compare an index that assumes perfectly price- and income-inelastic housing de-
mand (COL1), an index that assumes Cobb-Douglas preferences over housing and other goods
(i.e., unitary price and income elasticities of housing demand; COL2), an index that relaxes the
assumption of a unitary price elasticity but maintains the assumption of homotheticity (i.e., a CES
demand function; COL3), and an index that allows for a non-homothetic CES demand function at
the median household income and one half the median household income (Separable CES; COL4).
Figure 3.7 plots these indices against the relative price of housing (pj/cj) for realistic variations
over time and space. Panel A uses parameters close to those estimated in column 3 of Table 3.1,
while panel B uses the alternative parametrization in Table 3.4 and 3.5, which is meant to account
for likely biases in the cross-sectional estimates.
Figure 3.7 shows how the fixed housing demand measure overstates differences in cost-of-
living by ignoring households’ ability to substitute between housing and other goods according to
their relative prices, while the Cobb-Douglas preference measure understates these differences by
assuming that substitution is easier than in reality. The separable (non-homothetic) CES COLI is
steeper than those that fail to account for income effects. For poorer households, the other COLIs
understate the burden of living in expensive areas, and overstate it in poorer areas. The correct
index accounts for how high-rent cities are especially expensive for the poor. Of course, the regular
39For quantitative and analytical purposes, researchers might do well to use a more stylized LES utility and COL











This corresponds to a typical housing share of 25 percent, with the minimum being 10 percent of median income. For
a typical household the own-price elasticity is -2/3 and the income elasticity is 2/3.
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CES function could be adapted to poorer households simply by changing its distribution parameter
δ. The advantage of the non-homothetic CES function is that it offers a continuous mapping of
cost-of-living for any income group, properly referenced to a given city at a given point in time.
3.6.4 Real Income Changes over Time and Growing Real Income
Inequality
Using the ideal price index to deflate changes in income over time has different effects than using
a fixed bundle index for two reasons. First, because housing is a necessity, the welfare of poorer
households is reduced more by increases in the price of housing. Second, our index corrects for
“substitution bias” automatically, mitigating welfare reduction for all groups. Table 3.6 deflates
the nominal changes at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the household income distribution
from 1970 to 2010 using our ideal cost-of-living index and a comparable fixed-price index. Once
again, we consider the two parametrizations from Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 along with the official
and revised CPIs.
Nominal incomes of households at the 90th percentile rose 27 percentage more quickly than
those at the 50th percentile and 25 percent more quickly than those at the 10th percentile. With
homothetic preferences, the differences in real income growth of households at those percentiles
would have tracked the differences in nominal income growth. Our ideal index (COL4), using the
first parametrization, shows that with the official CPI, households at the 10th percentile saw real
income growth of 10.9 percent, while those at the 90th percentile saw growth of 46.1 percent. This
implies that real income inequality grew by 35.2 percent between these groups, or 3 percent more
than standard numbers would show. Using the revised CPI, our ideal index implies that real in-
comes at the 90th percentile grew 9.7 percent faster than a fixed consumption bundle would imply,
as the income effect pushed down richer households’ share of expenditure devoted to housing. The
results suggest that real income inequality grew by 45.7 percent from 1970 to 2010.
These differences are graphed in Figure 3.8 for the 50th and 90th percentiles. With the revised
CPI we see incomes rising for all groups, but noticeably more for the 90th percentile. The figure
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shows that using the revised CPI implies an even larger increase in real income inequality than
implied by the official CPI.
The smaller substitution possibilities implied by the second parametrization implies that all
households experienced weaker real income growth than suggested by the first parametrization.
However, the growth of real income inequality is also smaller under this parametrization.
3.7 Conclusion
Our econometric framework reveals that a spatial framework may be useful for estimating demand
systems for goods, such as housing, whose prices vary considerably across locations. Both tempo-
ral and spatial estimates suggest that uncompensated own-price and income elasticities are close to
two-thirds in absolute value. Thus, unit elasticities are better approximations than zero elasticities,
although neither extreme can explain the observed variation in housing consumption across metro
areas and over time.40
Rising rents appear to be the primary driver of the rising housing share in the national income
accounts, and, to a lesser degree, the affordability crisis in rental markets. Increasing inequality as
well as declining household sizes also appear to play a role, but there is some room for a secular
rise in housing consumption that basic economic modeling cannot explain.
The estimated non-homothetic CES utility and cost-of-living functions we provide should be
useful for realistic and tractable quantitative modeling in several economic fields.41 They suggest
substantial roles for substitution as well as for non-homotheticity. Indeed, we find that expensive
cities are even more expensive for the poor, thereby exacerbating affordability problems. More-
over, nationally rising rents over time have increased real-income inequality considerably, even
while spatial trends have not (Moretti (2013)). These findings highlight the idea that the “afford-
40Taste-based sorting across space may bias our estimates towards finding greater price elasticity, but a large role
for sorting seems incompatible the results of our specification tests. Moreover, those tests provide unique support for
spatial estimates, as well as indirect evidence that household mobility is great enough to ensure compensating price
and income differentials.
41Our elasticity of substitution estimates are consistent with the assumptions made by Albouy and Stuart (2014) and
Rappaport (2008), who do not consider non-homotheticity.
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ability crisis” in housing is deeply tied to the overall well-being of households, particularly at the
bottom of the income distribution. Therefore, policies and regulations that raise rents by creating
artificial shortages in housing supply (Glaeser and Gyourko (2003), Albouy and Ehrlich (2018))
may have particularly concerning distributional consequences.42
42See Davis et al. (2016) for potential impacts of high rents on the educational impacts of the poor.
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3.8 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Compensated Demand Function Estimates at the Metropolitan Level Using 2000 Census
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Median Log Median Log Median Log Median Log Median Log Median Log Aggreg. Log Median
Dependent Variable: Rental Share Rental Share Rental Share Rental Share Spend. Share Hous. Share Rental Share Rental Share
Regression Results:
Rental/Housing Price Index 0.172 0.233 0.239 0.246 0.509 0.482 0.233 0.163
(0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015)
Non-Housing Price Index -0.185 -0.239 -0.246 -0.088 -0.143 -0.233 0.475
(0.087) (0.027) (0.027) (0.121) (0.098) (0.025) (0.285)
Predicted Wage Index -0.298 -0.282 -0.287 -0.354 -0.559 -0.173 -0.529
(0.108) (0.112) (0.112) (0.104) (0.069) (0.115) (0.027)
Homeownership Rate 0.079
(0.061)
Constant -1.492 -1.492 -1.492 -1.492 -1.797 -1.706 -1.640 -1.495
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Sample Size 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 1655
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.518 0.519 0.524 0.904 0.887 0.432 0.109
Constrained Regression No No Yes Yes No No Yes No
0.047 0.047 0.043 0.421 0.340 0.065 0.622
(0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.108) (0.085) (0.082) (0.287)
P-value of Test of Homog. of Demand 0.504 0.504 0.519 0.000 0.000 0.429 0.031
Sample Renters Only Renters Only Renters Only Renters Only Owners Only
Renters and 
Owners Renters Only Renters Only
Unit of Observation MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA PUMA
Implied Demand Parameters:
0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.166 0.182 0.194 0.224
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
-0.828 -0.701 -0.698 -0.690 -0.434 -0.420 -0.734 -0.719
(0.026) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.021) (0.037) (0.019)
1.000 0.702 0.718 0.713 0.646 0.441 0.827 0.471
Restricted (0.108) (0.112) (0.112) (0.104) (0.069) (0.115) (0.027)
0.692 0.683 0.712 0.790
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.019)
0.114 0.111 0.098 0.151
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
1.178 1.165 0.743 3.252
(0.444) (0.430) (0.484) (0.241)
Distribution Parameter
Non-homotheticity Parameter
Unconstrained Sum of Housing and Non-
Housing Price Index Coefficients
Geometric Mean Expenditure Share
Uncompensated Own Price Elasticity of 
Housing Demand
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Elasticity of Substitution Between Housing 
and Consumption Goods 
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The predicted wage index is based on the wage level predicted
by education, experience, race, immigrant status, occupation, and industry, partialing out the effect of location. Ho-
mogeneity of demand test is for whether the coefficients on the rental/housing price index and the non-housing price
index sum to zero. All regressions include controls for the log trimean of household size. All regressions exclude
households that include college students.
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Table 3.2: Uncompensated and Compensated Demand Functions with Household Size and




ensated Compensated Compensated Amenity Value
Housing 
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Rental Share Rental Share Rental Share Rental Share Qual. of Life
Adj. Rental 
Share
Panel A: Regression Results
0.553 0.529 0.233 0.149
(0.023) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025)
-0.037 0.105 -0.185 0.143





-0.299 -0.281 -0.204 -0.312
(0.045) (0.039) (0.147) (0.117)
0.047 0.058 0.291 0.182
(0.122) (0.096) (0.177) (0.129)
0.002 0.011 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
-0.010 -0.016 0.017 -0.021
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
-0.004 0.012 0.018 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
-0.007 0.002 0.025 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
0.005 0.019 0.009 0.016
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
0.003 0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-1.492 -1.492 -1.492 -1.492 -0.018
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Sample Size (number of areas) 331 329 331 329 329
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.817 0.518 0.655 0.439
-0.017 0.133 0.047 0.292
(0.053) (0.055) (0.071) (0.078)
P-value of Test of Homog. of Demand 0.744 0.016 0.504 0.0002
Panel B: Implied Demand Parameters
0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.447 -0.471 -0.700 -0.784
(0.023) (0.033) (0.043) (0.038)
0.467 0.499 0.702 0.700
(0.036) (0.036) (0.108) (0.093)
0.458 0.468 0.121 -1.095
(0.078) (0.073) (0.584) (0.718)
Trimean Fraction of Children
Mild Winters (Minus Heating Degree 
Days in 1000s)
Constant
Unconstrained Sum of Price and Income 
Coefficients
Cool Summers (Minus Cooling Degree 
Days in 1000s)
Percent of Annual Sunshine Possible 
Proximity to Coast (Log Inverse Distance)
Hilliness (Average Slope of Land)
Clean Air  (minus median AQI)
Rental/Housing Price Index
Log Trimean Household Income per 
Capita
Log Trimean Household size
Non-Housing Price Index
Household Skill Index
Congestion  of Housing Consumption φ
Geometric Mean Expenditure Share
Uncompensated Own Price Elasticity of 
Housing Demand
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Note: All specifications include renters only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Test of homogeneity of demand
for the uncompensated regressions is that the coefficients on both price indices and income sum to zero. Rental share
in column 6 is adjusted to reflect quality-of-life’s effects on real income as discussed in Section 3.5.1 and footnote 33.
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Table 3.3: National Housing Demand Over Time - Estimates
Data Source: BEA BEA CEX CEX
Consumer Price Index: Official Revised Official Revised
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Restricted Regression Results
0.452 0.351 0.171 0.177
(0.042) (0.034) (0.140) (0.131)
-0.389 -0.324 -0.205 -0.207
(0.060) (0.051) (0.173) (0.172)
Linear Time Trend (years) 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log Household Size -0.359 0.333 0.760 0.819
(0.093) (0.125) (0.698) (0.683)
Constant -1.717 -1.717 -1.222 -1.222
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Sample size (years) 45 45 31 31
Sample Period
P-value of Test of Homogeneity of Demand 0.455 0.515 0.857 0.743
Panel B: Implied Demand Parameters
0.180 0.180 0.295 0.295
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.548 -0.649 -0.829 -0.823
(0.042) (0.034) (0.140) (0.131)
0.611 0.676 0.795 0.794
(0.060) (0.052) (0.173) (0.172)
Geometric Mean Expenditure Share
Uncompensated Own-Price Elasticity of Housing Demand
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Log Aggregate Housing Expenditure Share
Log CPI-U: Shelter minus Log CPI-U: All Items Less Shelter
Log Average Income/Expenditures Per Capita minus Log CPI-
U: All Items Less Shelter
1970-2014 1984-2014
Note: Newey-West standard errors reported in parentheses. Income/expenditure measure in per capita terms. Homo-
geneity of demand requires that the coefficients on log CPI-U for shelter, log CPI-U for all items less shelter, and
log real household income sum to zero. The restricted regressions shown impose this constraint making one estimate
redundant. For non-BEA series, a moving average with weight of 0.5 for the year after and the year before is used.
Columns 2 and 4 revise the CPI-U for shelter according to Crone et al. (2010), and also revise the CPI-U for Shelter































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Understanding Increases in Housing Affordability Burdens for Renters, 1970-2010
Share with Share with
Median Moderate Extreme
Exependiture Burden Burden
Share (over 30%) (over 50%)
(1) (2) (3)
Renter Households in 2010 0.307 0.527 0.277
Parameterization 1: Income Elasticity 2/3, Elasticity of Substitution 2/3
1. Undoing Changes in Household Composition 0.308 0.527 0.270
2. Undoing Increases in Income Inequality 0.295 0.498 0.260
3. Undoing Changes in Relative Rents 0.293 0.494 0.257
4A. Undoing Increase in Average Income (Revised CPI) 0.323 0.554 0.292
5A. Undoing Increase in Average Rents (Revised CPI) 0.258 0.420 0.216
4B. Undoing Increase in Average Income (Official CPI) 0.295 0.497 0.259
5B. Undoing Increase in Average Rents (Official CPI) 0.267 0.438 0.226
Parameterization 2: Income Elasticity 5/6, Elasticity of Substitution 1/2
1. Undoing Changes in Household Composition 0.308 0.527 0.270
2. Undoing Increases in Income Inequality 0.302 0.511 0.265
3. Undoing Changes in Relative Rents 0.298 0.505 0.261
4A. Undoing Increase in Average Income (Revised CPI) 0.313 0.535 0.278
5A. Undoing Increase in Average Rents (Revised CPI) 0.233 0.371 0.185
4B. Undoing Increase in Average Income (Official CPI) 0.299 0.507 0.262
5B. Undoing Increase in Average Rents (Official CPI) 0.263 0.430 0.218
Renter Households in 1970 0.197 0.303 0.156
Note: Datasets used are 1970 Census and 2010 American Community Survey. Moderate burden is defined as an
expenditure share on housing in excess of 30%; extreme burden is defined as expenditure share in excess of 50%.
Counterfactual 1 assumes no change in household composition 1970-2010. Counterfactual 2 assumes no increase in
income inequality 1970-2010. Counterfactual 3 additionally assumes no increase in dispersion of rents across metro
areas 1970-2010. Counterfactual 4 additionally assumes no increases in average incomes 1970-2010, deflated by CPI.
Counterfactual 5 assumes no increase in average rents 1970-2010, deflated by CPI.
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Ideal Correction to 
Fixed
Parameterization 1: Income Elasticity 2/3, Elasticity of Substitution 2/3
10th Percentile 6.103 5.504 1.109 1.120 -0.011
50th Percentile 6.002 5.440 1.103 1.102 0.002
90th Percentile 7.869 5.386 1.461 1.444 0.017
10th Percentile 6.103 4.862 1.255 1.253 0.002
50th Percentile 6.002 4.717 1.273 1.232 0.040
90th Percentile 7.869 4.596 1.712 1.615 0.097
Parameterization 2: Income Elasticity 5/6, Elasticity of Substitution 1/2
10th Percentile 6.103 5.473 1.115 1.120 -0.005
50th Percentile 6.002 5.442 1.103 1.102 0.001
90th Percentile 7.869 5.414 1.453 1.444 0.009
10th Percentile 6.103 4.825 1.265 1.253 0.012
50th Percentile 6.002 4.753 1.263 1.232 0.031
90th Percentile 7.869 4.688 1.678 1.615 0.063
Panel 2B: Revised CPI
Panel 2A: Official CPI
Panel 1A: Official CPI
Panel 1B: Revised CPI
Note: Income ratio in nominal terms from Census data. Ideal deflator uses estimated COL4 index and fixed-bundle
deflator uses COL1 index as described in Section 3.6.3. Revised CPI uses Boskin and CNV revisions described in the
text. Ideal correction takes difference.
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1959 1970 1980 1990 2000 2014
Year
Housing and utilities Funishings and h.hold equipment
Motor vehicles and parts Transportation services
Gasoline and other energy goods Recreational goods and vehicles
Food and beverages Clothing and footwear
Other goods Health care
Financial services Recreation services
















Panel A: Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Category, 1959-2014
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
 Official CPI  Revised CNV  Revised: CNV + Boskin





















































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
 Mean - All  Median - Owners  Median - Renters











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
 Household Size  Number Adults  Fraction Children (RHS)
Panel C: Household Demographics
Note: CPI = Consumer Price Index. CNV = Crone, Nakamura, and Voith (2010), Boskin from New Product bias in
Table 2of the Boskin Commission (1996) Report. Income and Household Demographics from Current Population








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































National Average, Kansas City
Los Angeles
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San Jose
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National Average, Kansas City
Los Angeles
Original Time Change
From 1970 to 2010
San Jose
Revised Time Change










































































































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
 50th Percentile: Official CPI  90th Percentile: Official CPI
 50th Percentile: CNV Revision  90th Percentile: CNV Revision
 50th Percentile: CNV + Boskin Revision  90th Percentile: CNV + Boskin Revision
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Linear Fit Slope = 0.463 (0.006)
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ACS Rents vs. Zillow Rent Index, 2014 
.
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2013-2014
Note: These figures plot the distribution of mortgage-supply shock at county-level since 2008. A more positive
number indicates a more contracted supply shock. The measured shock is calculated in two steps. First I estimate the
probability of rejecting mortgage application, and extract the bank-specific supply of credit from the bank-year fixed
effects. Second, I use the bank-specific measure of credit supply to compute county-specific changes in credit supply
with a shift-share approach. For each consequential years pair, I calculate the difference of bank-year fixed effects for
the same lender. Then I weigh them by mortgage application market share of each bank at that county in the base year.
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Appendix B
Separable Family of CES
B.1 Formulation and Parameters
We use the simple “separable family” of CES utility function from Sato (1977), and complement








where θi = − (1/γ − δi) ρ − δi is composed of more elementary parameters. These are the dis-
tribution parameter, δ1 = δ and δ2 = δ − 1 < 0, the substitution parameter, σ = 1/(1 − ρ), and
the non-homotheticity parameter, γ. Raising the arguments by 1/γ helps with the limiting case
as γ → 0. The utility function is express in per–capita terms, so that co-habitating with others
consuming the same amount contributes n1−φ times the amount from sharing.
B.2 Marginal Rate of Substitution










































B.3 Expenditure Share on Housing
To solve for the expenditure share on housing, note that d ln y/d lnx = dy/dx(x/y) = cx/py =





















With σ < 1 and γ > 0, the relative share of x to y increases with u/Q as well as c. It increases






















Taking logarithms, we obtain an only partly linear equation











To complete the log-linearization, we take the total derivative to get the approximation:
ŝy = (1− sy)(1− σ)
[
p̂− ĉ− γû+ γQ̂− (1− φ)n̂
]
Relating the above equation to the regression equation ((3.5b)) we can set gives β0 = σ ln δ =
ln s̄y, β1 = (1 − s̄y)(1 − σ), and γ = −β3/β1 if the term in brackets is set to one for reference
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prices p = c = 1 and a reference household size normalized to 1 n = 1 (so that n is household size









For instance, suppose eβ0 = 1/4, and β1a = 1/2, then σ = 2/3 and δ = 1/8. Then we need
u/Q = 0.64 β3 = −γ(1 − s̄y)(1 − σ). The parameters can thus be expressed recursively as
σ = 1− β1/(1− eβ0), δ = eβ0/σ
B.4 Hicksian Demand and Expenditure Functions
The Hicksian, or compensated, demands for the housing and non-housing goods associated with


































where ẽ is a standard CES price index adjusted with an increasing utility weight on c and a division























The expenditure for the NH-CES function with the Barten adjustment is then:
























We define cities at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level using the 1999 Office of Man-
agement and Budget definitions of primary MSAs (e.g., San Francisco is separate from Oakland
and San Jose), of which there are 311. Data from the U.S. Census data from Integrated Public-Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS), from Ruggles et al. (2004), for several purposes.
C.1 Wage Differentials
The wage differentials are calculated for workers ages 25 to 55 who report working at least 30
hours a week, 26 weeks a year. The MSA assigned to a worker is determined by their place
of residence, rather than their place of work. The wage differential of an MSA is calculated by
regressing log hourly wages on a rich set of covariates and a set of indicators for which MSA a
worker lives in. The wage differentials are taken to be the coefficients on these MSA indicators,
renormalized to have a national average value of zero. The covariates consist of:
• 12 indicators of educational attainment;
• a quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of education;
• 9 indicators of industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 9 indicators of employment at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 4 indicators of marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated);
• an indicator for veteran status, and veteran status interacted with age;
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• 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other);
• an indicator of immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status interacted
with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other;
• 2 indicators for English proficiency (none or poor).
All covariates are interacted with gender.
This regression is run using census-person weights.
C.2 Housing Rent and Price Indices
The housing rent and price differentials are calculated using the logarithm of rents, whether they are
reported gross rents or imputed rents derived from housing values. The differential housing price
of an MSA is calculated in a manner similar to the wage differential, except using a regression of
the actual or imputed rent on a set of covariates at the unit level and a set of MSA indicators. The
covariates for the adjusted differentials are:
• 9 indicators of building size;
• 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number of
rooms interacted with number of bedrooms;
• 2 indicators for lot size;
• 7 indicators for when the building was built;
• 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
• 8 indicators for home heating fuel;
• an indicator for commercial use;
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• an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
We first run a regression of housing values on housing characteristics and MSA indicator variables
weighting by census-housing weights. The housing-price index are taken from the MSA indicator
variables in this regression, renormalized to have a national average of zero.
C.2.1 Alternative Census Housing Price Index
The Alternative Census Housing Price Index are estimated from the 2000 united States Census
5% data from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), following Malpezzi et al.
(1998). The housing price differentials are calculated using the logarithm of rents, whether they are
reported gross rents or imputed rents derived from housing values. We first fit separate regressions
for each MSA, regressing the log yearly rents on a set of MSA dummies and a number of covariates
at the unit level. We then use the predicted price from each regression in each location to get the
normalized price index. The covariates for the adjusted differential are:
• 9 indicators of building size;
• 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number of
rooms interacted with number of bedrooms;
• 2 indicators for lot size;
• 7 indicators for when the building was built;
• 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
• 8 indicators for home heating fuel;
• an indicator for commercial use;
• an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
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We first run a hedonic regression for each MSA, using housing characteristics alone. Second, we
calculate predicted housing prices in each MSA from each regression, and calculate the MSA-level
means. Third, we obtain the normalized housing price index for each MSA by using the predicted
values of housing minus the national average.
C.2.2 CEX Housing Price Index
The CEX Housing Price Index is computed from 1997-2003 pooled Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey. The housing price differentials are calculated using the logarithm of rents, whether they are
reported gross rents or imputed rents derived from housing values. We regress the log yearly rents
on a set of geographical area dummies and a number of covariates at the unit level. The geograph-
ical area is defined based on state, population size, and whether it is in a metro area. In order to
compare with the other price indices, we match CEX geographical units with Census PMSAs by
state, population, and metropolitan area status. The matching process is not perfect, since a state
may have two MSAs with indistinguishable populations, preventing us from differentiating them.
The covariates for the adjusted differentials are:
• 9 indicators of building size;
• 9 indicators of building structure;
• 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number of
rooms interacted with number of bedrooms;
• 5 indicators for the number of bathrooms;
• 7 indicators for when the building was built;
• 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
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• 4 indicators for home heating fuel;
• an indicator for commercial use;
• an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
We first run a regression of housing values on housing characteristics and geographical area in-
dicator variables weighting by CEX-housing weights. The housing-price index is taken from the
coefficients on the geographical area indicator variables in this regression, renormalized to have a
national average of zero.
C.2.3 CEO Prices Panel Housing Price Index
We use the Carrillo et al. (2013) Prices Index Panel for all areas in the United States in the year
2000. CEO’s source of housing data is HUD’s 2000 Section 8 Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS).
They produce a geographic housing price index for 2000 by estimating a hedonic regression. They
regress the logarithm of gross rents on observed characteristics of the rental units and their neigh-
borhoods, other determinants that reflect unobserved characteristics that affect market rents, and
a set of geographic area dummies for metropolitan areas and the non-metropolitan areas of each
state.
C.3 Housing Expenditure Share
C.3.1 Census Housing Expenditure Share
The Census housing expenditure share is calculated from the 2000 United States 5% data from the
Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The housing expenditure share is calculated as
the ratio of housing expenditure to household income. For renters, we use gross rent as housing
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expenditure, while for owners, we use imputed rents derived from housing values plus utility fees.
The cross-MSA mean of the MSA-level median rental share is .225 and the mean of the MSA-level
meadian housing share for both renters and owners is 0.196.
C.3.2 AHS Rental Share
The AHS rental share is computed from the 1974-2013 American Housing Survey microdata.
The AHS housing expenditure share is defined as the ratio of monthly housing cost to household
income.
C.3.3 CEX Rental Share
The CEX rental share in Appendix Table C.2 is derived from 1997-2003 Consumer Expenditure
Survey microdata. The rental share in Figure 3.1 Panel B is derived from 1974-2014 microdata.
The CEX rental share is computed as the ratio of expenditure on rents to total expenditure. We
define geographies in the CEX as discussed in section C.2.2.
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Table C.1: Compensated Demand Functions - Additional Years, Datasets, and Price Indices -
Renters Only





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Regression Results
Rental/Housing Price Index 0.219 0.246 0.283 0.203 0.118
(0.042) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.034)
Non Housing Price Index -0.219 -0.246 -0.283 -0.203 -0.118
(0.042) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.034)
Predicted Wage Index -0.407 -0.266 -0.483 -0.235 -0.163
(0.133) (0.141) (0.102) (0.115) (0.134)
Constant -1.538 -1.476 -1.275 -1.492 -1.492
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sample Size (number of areas) 328 331 331 331 331
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 0.604 0.582 0.481 0.379
Homogeneity of Demand Restricted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-0.175 -0.355 0.149 0.058 0.146
(0.207) (0.173) (0.068) (0.073) (0.098)
P-value of Test of Homogeneity of Demand 0.398 0.041 0.030 0.429 0.137
Panel B: Implied Demand Parameters
0.215 0.229 0.279 0.225 0.225
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.693 -0.694 -0.582 -0.744 -0.846
(0.053) (0.051) (0.047) (0.043) (0.057)
0.593 0.734 0.517 0.765 0.837
(0.133) (0.141) (0.102) (0.115) (0.134)
0.720 0.682 0.607 0.738 0.848
(0.054) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.044)
0.882 0.885 0.878 0.867 0.828
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
1.856 1.083 1.705 1.157 1.382
(0.682) (0.537) (0.333) (0.534) (0.980)
Elasticity of Substitution Between Housing 
and Consumption Goods σ
Distribution Parameter δ
Non-homotheticity Parameter γ
All specifications include renters only. Columns 1 through 3 use the 1980 Census, 1990 Census, and 2007-2011 American Community
Surveys to calculate house price indices and rental shares as in table 1. Column 4 calculates the house price index similarly to Malpezzi et
al. (1998) as described in appendix B.2.1. Column 5 constructs the house price index using the Price Indexes Panel provided by Carrillo,
Early, and Olsen (2013), described in appendix B.2.4. Columns 4 through 5 use the share of income devoted to housing from the 2000
Census as the rental share. 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: COMPENSATED DEMAND FUNCTIONS -  ADDITIONAL YEARS, DATASETS, AND PRICE INDICES - 
RENTERS ONLY
Log Median Rental Share
Unconstrained Sum of Housing and Non-
Housing Price Index Coefficients
Geometric Mean Expenditure Share
Uncompensated Own Price Elasticity of 
Housing Demand
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Note: All specifications include renters only. Columns 1 through 3 use the 1980 Census, 1990 Census, and 2007-2011
American Community Surveys to calculate house price indices and rental shares as in table 1. Column 4 calculates the
house price index similarly to Malpezzi et al. (1998) as described in appendix C.2.1. Column 5 c nstructs the house
pric index using the Price Indexes Panel provided by Carrillo et al. (2013), described in appendix C.2.3. Columns 4
through 5 use the share of income devoted to housing from the 2000Census as the rental share.
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Table C.2: Metro Level Regressions - Consumer Expenditure Survey






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression Type: Compensated Compensated Uncompensated Uncompensated
Panel A: Regression Results
Housing Price Index 0.341 0.525 0.685 0.723
(0.056) (0.042) (0.075) (0.077)
Log Median Predicted Expenditure -0.086 0.001 -0.644 -0.549
(0.164) (0.129) (0.075) (0.081)
Constant -1.013 -1.174 -1.013 -1.174
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Sample Size (number of areas) 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.289 0.573 0.723 0.815
P-value of Test of Homogeneity of Demand 0.000 0.000 0.736 0.004
Panel B: Implied Demand Parameters
0.363 0.309 0.363 0.309
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.628 -0.476 -0.315 -0.277
(0.104) (0.072) (0.075) (0.077)
0.914 1.001 0.356 0.451
(0.164) (0.129) (0.075) (0.081)
0.465 0.241 0.292 0.199
(0.089) (0.061) (0.083) (0.081)
The data are from Consumer Expenditure Survey 1997-2003.All regressions are constrained to exhibit homogeneity of demand.  
Standard errors are clustered at the metro level. The predicted income measure in Panel A is the median predicted expenditures of 
all adults in the household.
APPENDIX TABLE 2: METRO LEVEL REGRESSIONS - CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY
Geometric Mean Expenditure Share
Uncompensated Own Price Elasticity of Housing Demand
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Elasticity of Substitution Between Housing and Consumption 
Goods σ
Note: The data are from Consumer Expenditure Survey 1997-2003.All regressions are constrained to exhibit homo-
geneity of demand. Standard errors are clustered at the metro level. The predicted income measure in Panel A is the
median predicted expenditures of all adults in the household.
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Census Housing Price Index
Linear Fit: Slope = 1.006 (0.007)
Reverse Linear Fit : Slope = 1.026 (0.007)
45-degree line





























































-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Census Housing Price Index
Linear Fit: Slope = 0.933 (0.019)
Reverse Linear Fit : Slope = 1.079 (0.022)
45-degree line


































































-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Census Housing Price Index
Linear Fit: Slope = 0.991 (0.038)
Reverse Linear Fit : Slope = 1.184 (0.045)
45-degree line
Panel C: AHS vs. Census Housing Price Index
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Census Housing Price Index
Linear Fit: Slope = 0.590 (0.041)
Reverse Linear Fit : Slope = 1.064 (0.075)
45-degree line
Panel D: CEX vs. Census Housing Price Index
Data Source: 2000 Census, 1997-2003 CEX, 1997-2003 AHS, renters only
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